Today’s key macro event remains the U.S.-Iran standoff: U.S. forces struck three Iranian tankers, while Iran attacked U.S. naval vessels and tankers. Since mid-August, when it was noted that U.S.-Iran tensions were trending toward prolonged conflict, signs of this long-term escalation have become increasingly pronounced. Let’s discuss a few points: 1. Why hasn’t Trump recently used TACO? In my view, this may stem from three factors: 1) Hegseth likely gave Trump confidence: he believes nighttime escort operations have enabled most tankers to quietly transit the Strait of Hormuz—this has had some effect, but only partial; 2) Bessent convinced Trump that stronger sanctions and blockades to strangle Iran’s economic lifelines will force Tehran to capitulate—but this will take considerable time to yield results; 3) With the midterm elections approaching, Trump cannot easily acknowledge Iran’s de facto control over the Strait, as it would invite fierce attacks from Democrats. Lately, I’ve been wondering whether Hegseth and Bessent have given Trump a kind of “mysterious confidence.” 2. The core issue lies in differing assessments of who benefits from time: 1) The U.S. may reason: As non-Iranian oil supplies gradually recover and global markets adapt, while Iran’s new export revenues remain constrained, prolonged pressure will further strain Tehran’s finances. 2) Iran may reason: As long as it retains sufficient capacity to strike and instill fear in shipowners, insurers, and markets, U.S. economic and electoral pressures will persist. Continued resistance may eventually force Washington to accept more favorable terms. This creates two mutually reinforcing cycles: 1) As the U.S. enhances transit capacity (nighttime escorts), Iran has incentive to prove the Strait remains dangerous; Iran launches attacks → the U.S. gains justification to strike Iranian radar systems, launchers, and related maritime assets. 2) As the U.S. compresses Iran’s revenue, Iran has incentive to raise regional economic costs; Rising regional risk prompts the U.S. to intensify economic and military pressure. Both sides may perceive each action as limited, but cumulatively, the scope of actions and losses will still expand. 3. This escalation again stems from control over the Strait: This week, U.S. officials claimed nighttime escort operations were highly effective—prompting Iran to prepare for a new round of mine-laying in the Strait. Upon observing Iran’s precise mine placement, the U.S. began striking Iranian military facilities; Iran retaliated; the U.S. targeted Iranian tankers. This has gone far beyond occasional harassment of commercial vessels, revealing the mindset of Iran’s hardliners: the more progress the U.S. makes with escorts and blockades, the more Iran fears losing leverage—and thus may attempt a more impactful strike. Short-term U.S. military or economic gains do not necessarily translate into immediate de-escalation. 4. Finally, who will blink first? 1) If Iran halts interference first, it fears the U.S. will continue its blockade; If the U.S. lifts the blockade first, it fears Iran will regain revenue while retaining the ability to restrict transit at any time. Without synchronized steps, verification mechanisms, or enforcement protocols for breach, a vague “agreement to resume shipping” is极易 re-entangled in disputes during implementation. The Oman joint statement still defers most permanent arrangements to future negotiations, underscoring that implementation details remain unresolved. Ultimately, it comes down to which side—the U.S. or Iran—can endure longer. Regimes with less public accountability can endure more, as they don’t need to respond to public sentiment. As discussed in late August: Before the midterm elections, Trump faces greater pressure; After the midterms, Iran will face greater pressure (as Trump has fewer political constraints). Thus, Trump did not quickly force Iranian concessions in August primarily because: Nighttime escorts alleviate some supply pressure but are insufficient to restore normal commercial shipping; Maritime blockades have severely damaged Iran’s crude exports, but translating economic pain into political concessions takes time—and requires Iran to believe concessions will yield credible returns. The midterm elections make it politically difficult for Trump to accept clear failure and increasingly hard for him to bear prolonged high living costs. He is more likely to maintain a hardline stance, continue pressure, and seek temporary arrangements he can frame as successes—depending on whether Iran cooperates. The long-term trend of “persistent blockade, struggle over transit, diplomatic back-and-forth, intermittent market shocks” is a more realistic baseline than “rapid comprehensive reconciliation.” Ultimately, it comes down to who breaks first. As noted on August 13: the greatest concern remains enduring prolonged hardship before one side finally cracks—the longer it drags on, the harder it becomes to suppress oil prices.