Author: Shenchao TechFlow
On November 16, the Layer 1 blockchain Kava Chain officially released a security update following an attack on its lending application HARD Lend, during which the attacker transferred approximately 53.9 million KAVA tokens, valued at around $1.83 million.
The Kava team has urgently patched the contract vulnerability and collaborated with multiple parties to track the funds, while launching a 7-day community governance proposal to permanently disable new lending on HARD Lend and provide orderly liquidation and redemption guidance for existing positions.

Sleeping BUSD account accounting vulnerability becomes attack vector
According to the details disclosed in the Kava Official Security Response Notice, the attack stemmed from a核算 vulnerability in the dormant BUSD collateral market within the HARD Lend lending account. This historical market had remained in a low-activity dormant state but retained its original collateral pricing logic.
The attacker exploited a pricing flaw to artificially inflate the book value of BUSD collateral within borrowing accounts. Using this inflated amount, the attacker repeatedly executed borrowing and liquidation cycles, draining the available liquidity from the pool and illicitly transferring approximately 539 million KAVA.
Over 90% of stolen tokens were sold across chains via LayerZero
On the fund transfer path, the attacker employed a rapid cross-chain liquidation strategy. On-chain data shows that approximately 49.2 million stolen tokens were subsequently transferred to BNB Chain and sold via LayerZero's official cross-chain browser, accounting for 91.28% of the cross-chain movement.
In response to the fund outflow, the Kava team immediately identified the vulnerability and triggered risk controls upon detecting the anomaly, successfully preventing further fund loss. As of November 16, portions of the involved funds have been successfully frozen on centralized exchanges and cross-chain bridges.
Currently, Kava contributors are collaborating with the ecosystem security team, major exchanges, and law enforcement agencies to conduct on-chain tracing and legal recovery of funds flowing to BNB Chain, aiming to severely restrict the attacker’s ability to cash out and facilitate asset recovery.
The attack was strictly isolated at the application layer; the mainnet consensus remains unaffected.
Regarding the underlying network security concerns raised by the community, Kava has clearly defined the scope of risk: this incident is strictly limited to the single application-layer contract of HARD Lend and did not affect the underlying consensus mechanism or blockchain network infrastructure of Kava Chain; no unauthorized token minting occurred at the protocol level.
By promptly isolating contract permissions, security losses were fully contained within the old lending pool. Network validation nodes continued block production and cross-chain communication remained operational, with the vast majority of other decentralized applications deployed independently within the ecosystem and users' personal on-chain deposits unaffected.
Initiate a seven-day community governance vote to permanently halt new lending services.
To completely eliminate historical technical debt, the Kava team is accelerating the deprecation of legacy features and has officially launched a 7-day community governance proposal. If approved, HARD Lend will permanently cease new lending and borrowing activities, and existing positions will be gradually phased out according to established guidelines.
External audits and investigations by independent entities into legacy contracts have become an industry consensus. According to the community timeline, this permanent shutdown proposal will be formally enacted after the 7-day voting period, providing a representative reference model for the subsequent code retirement and risk control measures of multi-asset lending protocols.




