This is the core flaw of most wallets today: address poisoning fundamentally exploits the fact that humans rely on their eyes to recognize 0x addresses. In the EOA model, it’s very easy to make transfer mistakes. But in Lukso’s UP model, identity, whitelists, spending limits, multisig, and risk controls can drive this error rate close to zero. For example, if the recipient is also a UP account, you see a name, avatar, social profile links, interaction history, etc. Even if someone creates a similar-looking address, forging an entire DID identity, social bindings, and historical records is far more difficult—making visual fraud much easier to detect. In addition, UP’s permission layer (LSP6) lets you configure bank-like rules, such as: •Only allow transfers above X USDT to whitelisted contacts •Require multisig or second-device confirmation for large transfers •Limit “first-time, never-seen-before addresses” to tiny test amounts (e.g., ≤ 100 USDT) If the user had added the real recipient UP to their whitelist in advance, then: A 50,000,000-USDT transfer to a completely unknown address should be blocked by the permission layer, or at least forced into multiple high-friction confirmations. Under this account model, a mistaken transfer of 49,999,950 USDT would almost certainly be stopped at the permission layer, instead of being sent out with a single careless click. It doesn’t mean UP makes errors impossible— but a 50-million-USDT transfer should never depend on nothing more than “copy + paste + send.”