The Across attacker didn't find a hidden bug. He used a function the code openly calls "unsafe". I pulled the on-chain calls, here's the attack step by step. The Solana wallet draining the relayer did one thing, over and over, 7 hours before Across said a word: it called an instruction literally named get_unsafe_deposit_id. Dozens of times. The name isn't a warning label someone forgot to remove. On the normal path the contract hands each deposit a sequential id, so it can never repeat. The unsafe path lets the depositor pick it: the id is just keccak(sender, depositor, nonce), and the nonce is yours to choose. Uniqueness stops being the contract's job and becomes the caller's promise. Break that promise and the accounting breaks with it. The attacker crafted deposits the relayer's bot read as real fill requests and paid out real ETH on Ethereum for, while the matching claim on Solana had nothing reimbursable behind it. Deposits got paused for exactly this reason: to stop new ones being minted. Follow the money and the intent is obvious. The main wallet was gassed from Tornado Cash, the Solana side funded through a no-KYC instant swapper. Proceeds sit in roughly 1,370 ETH, about $2.5M, across two addresses, 800 of it swept into a fresh wallet within minutes. No stolen keys, no reentrancy, no flash loan. Just a function stamped "unsafe" that turned out to mean it.