Across, an intent bridge, just got hacked. So the fair question is whether the same attack could hit NEAR Intents. I dug into both, and the answer is no, but not for the reason people will reach for. The Across attack had one precondition. A relayer paid the user first, on the destination chain, out of its own pocket, trusting that a deposit would reimburse it later. Everything downstream, the unsafe deposit id, the crafted fills, only worked because of the gap between paying and being confirmed as reimbursable. NEAR Intents has no such gap. You deposit into the Verifier contract before anything trades. It custodies both sides and settles net-zero: every leg of the swap clears in one atomic transaction, or none of it does. Nobody fronts capital against a promise, because the assets are already sitting there when the solver fills. There is no fill-now-reconcile-later step to slip a fake deposit into. I won't pretend the risk drops to zero though. It moves. The atomic part is the swap. The exposed part is the edge where value bridges in and out to Bitcoin, Solana, Ethereum, and that is fresh code per chain. Across is the reminder that a clean record lives in a codebase, not a logo, and every new chain resets the count. Different architecture, different wound. Atomic settlement shuts the door Across left open, and tells you which door is actually worth guarding: not the settlement, the on-ramp.