EX.IO Research Institute | September 10, 2026
The coming period may be the most densely packed with market signals since the second half of 2026. From the U.S. CPI release on September 11, to the concurrent Senate vote on the CLARITY bill and the FOMC meeting on September 15, followed by the Bank of Japan’s interest rate decision on September 17–18, and culminating in the midterm elections on November 3—five events, each capable of independently moving markets, are compressed into just eight weeks, a density rarely seen in recent years.
Beneath these five events lies a deeper current: Japan, the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasuries, is aggressively selling U.S. assets to defend the yen—defying warnings from Washington—with some commentators calling it a financial version of "Pearl Harbor 2.0."
According to EX.IO Research Institute, these signals may appear scattered, but they share a common logical thread: the global financial system’s “pricing anchor” is loosening—and what’s causing this shift is not just data, but a broader transformation in which geopolitical and economic alliances are yielding to immediate interests.
Once the anchor loosens, all assets on board—whether Web2 or Web3—must reconsider their weight.
In fact, global markets have gradually become increasingly tense. Over the past two weeks, three seemingly unrelated warning signs have flashed simultaneously across global markets: the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield touched 4.85% intraday on September 9, reaching its highest level since November 2023; the USD/JPY pair plunged below 155 to 153.80 following comments from U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent supporting the yen; and Brent crude oil broke above $100 per barrel for the first time since July 23.
If the three lights illuminate price, then a fourth light hangs above the U.S. Capitol in Washington— the CLARITY Act, regarded as the most important legislation for the crypto industry in over a decade, which will face a make-or-break vote in the Senate on September 15. Price, exchange rates, oil prices, and legislation—these four threads are tightening simultaneously, compounded by the highly volatile and随时可能再升级的美伊冲突—this is the full roster of the “five-fold pricing” window.
The story begins with a loosening anchor. The market has seen U.S. long-term bonds being sold off and interest rates surging again, but to understand this selling wave, we must first distinguish between “who is selling” and “why they are selling.” Look at the data: At the end of July this year, the 30-year U.S. Treasury yield closed at a five-year high for three consecutive trading days, reaching 5.27% on July 31; it rose again to 5.25%–5.29% on September 8–9. More noteworthy is the shape of the yield curve—during the week of late July, the 2-year yield actually fell by 4 basis points, while the spread between the 2-year and 30-year yields widened from 83 to 98 basis points. This is not a typical “rate hike trade” (which would feature short-end yields rising first), but rather the market demanding a higher term premium for holding long-term bonds: in other words, investors are not afraid of rate hikes—they’re losing faith in the IOU itself.
There are three driving forces behind the selling pressure. First is fiscal supply: under persistent deficit expansion, the issuance of long-term bonds has intensified, with institutions like Barclays already warning that market absorption capacity is being tested. Second is the structural withdrawal of overseas buyers—led by Japan, which sold a record $88 billion in foreign securities in August alone to intervene in currency markets, with approximately 70% of its foreign exchange reserves held in U.S. Treasuries; the selling by the largest foreign holder has directly undermined demand at the long end. Third is the ineffectiveness of policy hedging: on September 9, the Treasury announced a $6 billion long-bond buyback, a scale that disappointed traders, causing yields to rise rather than fall—even though Bessent raised the minimum per buyback from $2 billion to at least $4 billion and extended the buyback window through November 4, the market clearly views these measures as insufficient relative to Japan’s selling volume and fiscal issuance. Intriguingly, during the same period, high-yield bond spreads narrowed to a five-year low of 268 basis points—the market is repricing interest rates, not credit risk; the impact is concentrated on discount rates for valuation, not default expectations.
However, why is Japan, long regarded as "America's most loyal Asia-Pacific partner," taking such a hard stance on U.S. Treasuries at this precise moment?
The answer begins with a博弈 dubbed by the market as “Financial Pearl Harbor 2.0.” According to Japan’s Ministry of Finance, between July 30 and August 26—just under a month—the government and central bank collectively deployed a staggering 15.4 trillion yen to buy yen and sell dollars. For a country whose foreign reserves are 70% tied up in U.S. Treasuries, every intervention to defend the yen is essentially a sudden liquidation of dollar-denominated assets. This is not merely a market move—it’s a cold signal: when currency security and alliance loyalty cannot coexist, Tokyo chose the former. The traditional multilateral mechanisms of international finance are giving way to unilateral competition—there is no unshakable loyalty, only non-negotiable core interests.
Yet Washington’s countermove was equally unconventional. On August 31, Besant explicitly told CNBC during the G20 Finance Ministers’ meeting that “the Japanese government and the Bank of Japan will take actions to strengthen the yen,” adding a telling remark: “I have information the market doesn’t,” and stating he would not hesitate to participate in further coordinated intervention. One side sells, the other speaks—two allies directly clash in the foreign exchange market. The yen responded immediately, with USD/JPY dropping below the key support level of 155 to 153.80 on September 7, triggering massive stop-loss orders and selling by options traders. Since September, the yen has risen approximately 4%, making it the strongest among G10 currencies.
The reason a single statement from the U.S. Treasury Secretary carries such immense weight is that it not only sends a strong signal but also hits the turning point in monetary policy expectations: the OIS market has priced in a 97% probability of the Bank of Japan raising rates by 25 basis points at its September 17–18 meeting, and Reuters cited sources indicating internal discussions within the central bank about accelerating the pace of hikes; ING’s equilibrium exchange rate model suggests the yen remains undervalued against the dollar by approximately 20%. This points to a deeper implication: pressure to unwind carry trades. The scale of funds borrowed at near-zero cost in yen and invested in higher-yielding assets is estimated by markets to range between $500 billion and $20 trillion. In July–August 2024, an unexpected BOJ rate hike combined with intervention caused the USD/JPY to plunge nearly 14% within two months, triggering a global stock market crash in early August; when the yen surged sharply this February, the 24/7, most liquid crypto markets were hit first, becoming the “ATM” for unwinding carry trades.
History may not repeat exactly, but as long as the combination of a stronger yen and narrowing U.S.-Japan yield spread persists, this invisible global liquidity pump will continue to operate. As for the yen’s next move, it hinges on the Bank of Japan’s policy direction during its meeting on September 17–18—but just 48 hours before that, the U.S. Federal Reserve will have already held its own rate decision meeting on the other side of the globe, making it the most imminent market risk right now.
In fact, the special aspect of the FOMC meeting on September 15–16 was not the outcome itself, but the rewriting of the rules. Kevin Warsh, who assumed the chairmanship in May this year, delivered his hawkish debut at the Jackson Hole symposium on August 28: announcing the end of the long-standing forward guidance and emphasizing the need to maintain a 2% inflation target—yet July’s PCE data, at 3.7% year-over-year and core at 3.3%, clearly remained far from that goal. Market pricing for a 25-basis-point rate hike in September surged from around 35% before the speech to 55–62% afterward; the release of August nonfarm payrolls on September 4, showing an addition of 162,000 jobs—far exceeding the expected 53,000—further solidified the probability near 60%. Even more unusual was the 9–3 voting split at the July meeting, where three regional Fed presidents simultaneously cast dissenting votes in favor of a rate hike, while the median dot in the June dot plot at 3.8% had already been higher than the current rate range of 3.50%–3.75%.
In other words, regardless of whether there is a rate hike in September, the market has entered the "no guidance era" defined by Warsh: Fed officials no longer light the kerosene lamp to illuminate the path ahead—every data point must be redefined.
The next data release is right around the corner: the August CPI, due on September 11 (July year-over-year: 3.4%, core: 2.5%, with energy up 14.7% year-over-year). This “five-fifty pre-meeting” dynamic means any surprise in either direction will be amplified; even more subtly, the Treasury’s repurchase operations are moving in the opposite direction of the Fed’s hawkish stance—RSM’s chief economist has even bluntly stated, “The Treasury’s actions are undermining Warsh”—under this policy tug-of-war, long-end volatility remains stubbornly elevated.
However, monetary policy determines only the price of money; the real rules of the game are set by America’s new political landscape. Turning your attention from September to November, two political uncertainties await around the corner.
First, the midterm elections on November 3 will renew all 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 35 seats in the Senate. Currently, the Republicans hold a narrow majority in the Senate at 53-47 and in the House at 220-215. Major institutions generally believe Democrats have a slight edge in reclaiming control of the House. Historical patterns warrant caution: since 1974, the S&P 500 has averaged only a 1.7% return from August 1 to Election Day—uncertainty typically suppresses risk appetite until a “relief rally” occurs after results are finalized (with an average 5.7% gain over the following three months). Should a divided government emerge—with the president and Congress at odds—government funding could stall in gridlock, and the ticking time bomb of the 2027 debt ceiling negotiation looms; for bond markets already strained by supply pressures, this is far from favorable. For markets already battered by uncertainty, volatility across major assets will likely intensify. An intriguing coincidence: the Treasury’s window for increased buybacks ends precisely on November 4, the day after the election—the political intent to stabilize bond markets speaks for itself.
Another major factor, even preceding the election, has nearly been drowned out by an avalanche of information: the long-awaited but still unpassed CLARITY Act in the U.S. Congress. On September 15—the same day the FOMC convened—the Senate will hold a cloture vote on the CLARITY Act, requiring 60 votes to proceed to formal consideration. The bill’s journey has been fraught with setbacks: the House passed it overwhelmingly in July 2025 by a vote of 294 to 134, and the Senate Banking Committee advanced it in May this year by a 15-to-9 margin, but full Senate votes have repeatedly stalled over disputes regarding ethics provisions—Democrats insist on including clauses restricting officials from profiting from crypto assets, targeting the Trump family’s disclosed $1.4 billion in crypto earnings; meanwhile, Republicans hold only 53 seats in the Senate and need at least seven Democratic defections to pass it. The prediction market Polymarket currently prices the likelihood of the bill becoming law this year at only about 20%—meaning the market assigns an 80% probability that it will not pass this year.
The paths of "pass" and "fail" will significantly impact the pace of Web2+3 financial development in the United States and globally. If the bill passes on September 15, it still requires floor debate, reconciliation of House and Senate versions, and presidential signature—meaning final approval won’t come until late autumn at the earliest. However, the mere establishment of these rules will be sufficient to guide institutional capital in reassessing the legal tail risks of the U.S. market, unlocking a new wave of institutional growth for the industry.
Conversely, if the vote fails, the Senate will enter its election recess in October—Galaxy Research has already warned that once the legislative calendar slips into September, it “directly collides with the political momentum of the midterm elections,” making it difficult to schedule controversial bills; at that point, the only remaining opportunity would be the post-election “lame-duck” session, and if even this window closes, the bill will expire with the end of this Congress, requiring the next Congress to start over from scratch.
Going one step further, the variables extend beyond time: if the White House changes hands in January 2029 and the successor is a Democrat who may not support crypto, the policy windfall for Web3 could be abruptly halted—combining regulatory vacuum with renewed legislative activity, the market might return to a prolonged period of "policy silence," inevitably deepening uncertainty around the valuation fundamentals of mainstream crypto assets.
Moreover, there are deeper external uncertainties: if variables in Washington can still be probabilistically modeled, the truly unpredictable factor lies in the Persian Gulf. Since the outbreak of hostilities on February 28, the collapse of the temporary agreement in June, and the resumption of the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz on July 14, tensions escalated again in early September: on September 2, Iran launched missiles and drones at U.S. military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, and the UAE; on September 8, the U.S. Central Command reported the destruction of five Iranian crude oil tankers, prompting Brent crude prices to surge past $100, closing at $101.30—a nearly 60% year-to-date increase. The EIA estimates that production shutdowns in July reached 5.5 million barrels per day, pushing the U.S. gasoline average price to $4.01 per gallon (up from $3.14 a year ago). This is a classic supply-side stagflation shock: rising oil prices fuel inflation while simultaneously dampening growth, leaving the Fed caught between “fighting inflation with rate hikes” and “preserving growth by standing pat”—and this is the underlying fuel behind the elevated probability of a September rate hike.
More thought-provoking is the rewriting of the safe-haven logic. According to textbooks, geopolitical risks should boost U.S. Treasuries and the dollar; in reality, long-term bonds are being sold off due to inflation premiums, with capital shifting toward assets like gold (around $4,390 per ounce in early September, with a 2026 range of $4,100–$5,500) that carry no sovereign credit risk. When even the “most loyal allies” are selling U.S. Treasuries for their own benefit, the market has already voted with its feet: in the era of fiscal dominance, major sovereign long-term bonds are losing their monopoly as the “ultimate safe haven”—and this very shift is the macroeconomic foundation upon which new financial narratives of Web2 and Web3 thrive.
Under the叠加 of five variables, how should risk assets position themselves? Web3’s answer is written in the flow of capital: Bitcoin spot ETFs recorded approximately $3.5 billion in net inflows in August, the strongest month since September 2025, and on September 3 alone, they saw a single-day inflow of $731 million—the largest since January. Yet just two trading days earlier, the same capital had withdrawn over $200 million in a single day. Institutional money is present, but its loyalty is waning; the sharp swings between inflows and outflows are a direct reflection of macroeconomic uncertainty.
Notably, despite pressure from interest rates and geopolitics, the total net assets of Bitcoin ETFs have stabilized at approximately $103.3 billion (about 6.3% of Bitcoin’s total market cap), while inflows into most altcoin ETFs have sharply declined during the same period—a “flight to quality” under risk-averse sentiment is also occurring within Web3.
At a deeper level, Web3 in the new era is no longer merely Web3 driven by token issuance for self-growth. In August, EX. IO Research noted that the crypto market is now preemptively enabling price discovery for tech companies prior to IPOs through pre-IPO perpetual contracts—outpacing Web2. This means Web3 is no longer just a passive recipient of macro liquidity; its 24/7 market microstructure is emerging as a leading indicator for global risk pricing. Recently, numerous exchanges have rushed to launch pre-IPO tokens for popular upcoming listings—though the market may not be aware whether some of these assets truly have underlying backing. In this process, market confidence supported by compliance is especially critical. For instance, in May this year, Hong Kong-licensed virtual asset trading platform (VATP) EX. IO announced the successful listing and distribution of Asia’s first compliant tokenized depositary receipt (DR) linked to SpaceX equity, establishing an end-to-end framework that enables institutions and professional investors to access top-tier global private equity opportunities efficiently and compliantly—a significant industry milestone.
In addition, from the Jackson Hole symposium themed “Financial Innovation: Payments and Policy” to European Central Bank executives publicly advocating for central bank money on-chain, tokenization and on-chain settlement have entered the mainstream agenda of central banks; the fate of the CLARITY Act will determine whether this wave of institutionalization flows smoothly in the United States or runs aground on the shores of politics.
Return to the initial assessment. Over the next eight weeks, EX. IO Research believes that rather than guessing the direction of any single asset, focus on three key dates—the September 11 CPI, the September 15–16 FOMC and September 17–18 Bank of Japan, and the November 3 midterm elections—along with one vote (the September 15 Senate CLARITY Act) and one red line (the Strait of Hormuz).
The lesson from the financial version of "Pearl Harbor 2.0" is that when even allies begin acting independently, the loosening of pricing anchors is no longer a technical adjustment but a generational reassessment. For more investors, the market’s engine has already quietly shifted—now, prudent position management and liquidity reserves are becoming increasingly vital.
Disclaimer: This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute any investment advice, offer, or solicitation. Virtual asset prices are highly volatile, and investors may lose their entire principal. Data sources cited herein include the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the BLS, the EIA, CME FedWatch, Polymarket, SoSoValue, and publicly reported media; EX. IO Research strives for accuracy and completeness but does not guarantee them.
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