MicroStrategy Sells 3,588 BTC for Dividend Payments, Sparking Market Debate

Organized & Compiled by Shenchao TechFlow

Host / Guests: Austin Campbell, Zero Knowledge Group; Ram Ahluwalia, CEO of Lumida Wealth; Chris Perkins, Franklin Crypto

Podcast source: Bits + Bips (by Unchained)

Strategy Sells Bitcoin Again to Cover Dividends

Broadcast date: July 7, 2026

The backdrop for this episode of Bits + Bips is Michael Saylor’s Strategy selling another 3,588 BTC—cashin approximately $216 million—within a month for the second time, to pay preferred dividends. Three regular panelists and co-hosts—Austin Campbell, Ram Ahluwalia, and Chris Perkins—analyze this structural turning point from their respective professional perspectives: What cards does Strategy have left after the largest BTC buyer becomes a regular seller, the mNAV premium vanishes, preferred shares trade below par, and the cycle of “printing stock to buy Bitcoin” breaks down?

Austin opens with a quote from a hedge fund friend: “Saylor holds 5% of Bitcoin—maybe it’ll only surge after he gets liquidated”—highlighting the brutal logic of the crypto market: when someone becomes the central figure, their collapse can paradoxically serve as a catalyst. Ram analyzes the binary dilemma from a macro trader’s perspective: selling BTC undermines the narrative, while issuing new shares dilutes MSTR. He also mentions having listened to Saylor speak twice in London, where Saylor is fiercely defending preferred dividend payments to rebuild confidence. Chris, drawing from his investment banking background, notes that the foundation of financial engineering has been shaken now that mNAV has vanished.

But the discussion went far beyond Strategy. The three deeply unpacked the capital structure issues of tokens versus equity—why there have been no successful cases of "tokens and equity coexisting," the Pokémon card analogy, and the judgment that 99% of tokens will eventually go to zero. The stablecoin war was another major focus: Tether’s withdrawal from the European MiCA market, the "utility problem" of stablecoins (can you buy a cup of coffee with a stablecoin?), the governance black hole of OUSD’s 140-person alliance, and Robinhood’s entry into the government money market. The latter half expanded further to the strategic significance of bank-issued stablecoins—Scott Bessent’s theory of the "recapitalization of the Eurodollar market," JPMorgan potentially becoming the first trillion-dollar market cap bank, and the impending obsolescence of non-U.S. banks’ U.S. dollar deposit businesses—along with a valuation breakdown of Securitize’s IPO. Finally, the three also touched on the capital-siphoning effect of AI and semiconductors and the return of fundamentals to the crypto market.

Regarding the Strategy of Selling BTC and the "Three-Body Problem"

• A friend who specializes in global macro told me it’s hard to see the next wave of institutional adoption coming from pensions, sovereign funds, or central banks because Saylor holds 5% of Bitcoin. His exact words were: “Maybe the best thing would be for that guy to get liquidated, and then this thing would really take off.”
• Whenever someone becomes the star of the crypto market, their downfall is imminent. Strategy has been the star for some time now.
• The crypto narrative is currently stuck on MicroStrategy. Strategy isn’t crypto, and crypto isn’t Strategy, but we’re all stuck here. Just like back when Bloomberg only talked about PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) every day, the market will eventually move on.
• His actions today speak clearly—he is protecting dividends, hoping this will restore confidence.

Regarding the disappearance of mNAV and the breakdown of financial engineering

• They have two options: issue common stock to dilute MSTR, or sell Bitcoin and risk damaging the narrative.
• When the mNAV premium disappeared, the cycle of "printing shares to buy Bitcoin" was broken. You can no longer issue shares freely because the market no longer offers you a premium.
• BTC rose during the week of selling—Josh Mandel and Pete Rizzo both noticed. It behaved like a buyback. But bears will say: the premium is dead, BTC hasn’t truly rallied yet—it’s now a seller.

About Tokens vs. Equity

• We already have Delaware corporate law and centuries of capital structure. You can slice cash flows into different layers of debt, and what’s left is equity. There is no third category called "token" that can fit into this stack.
• If you have common equity, the token would need to function more like preferred stock or debt to have independent significance. If it’s just another form of equity, you might as well tokenize your equity directly.
• Pokémon cards are a good analogy—the company that issues the cards is separate from the cards themselves. You can tokenize a product without necessarily tokenizing equity.
• Looking ahead ten years, 90% of the current top 500 tokens will disappear. I think it will be 99%.
• Druckenmiller said during the dot-com bubble: "I already know this lesson; I don't need to learn it again."

About the Stablecoin War

• Stablecoins are the new net interest income. Everyone wants to grab that interest. Tether made so much money with such a basic product—how can I do the same?
• The biggest challenge for all stablecoins right now is utility. You can transfer them, but what can you actually do with stablecoins? Can you use them to buy a cup of coffee?
• Tether’s position is clear: this is soccer, not American football—they won’t play by Europe’s rules. BNP Paribas can’t afford to avoid doing business in France, but Tether can simply walk away from a market.
• OUSD is a "plan on paper." With 140 members and entirely different economic goals, the details are still incomplete. The hardest part—governance—was skipped, and the technology was launched first.

Regarding bank-issued stablecoins and market dynamics

• Stablecoins are essentially a recycling of the Eurodollar market. If JPMorgan or Bank of America issue stablecoins, they can earn NIM from Thai merchants or Chinese suppliers.
• JPMorgan could become the first bank with a $1 trillion market capitalization. They are currently valued at over $900 billion and spend $13–16 billion annually on technology.
• The biggest losers may be non-U.S. banks offering U.S. dollar deposit accounts. If I can buy stablecoins directly, why should I go through my local bank and endure poor exchange rates and fees?
• Securitize’s current trading resembles a call option—you’re betting on a 10% chance it’s worth $1.8 billion and a 90% chance it’s worth nothing.
• Last quarter, every sector of the S&P 500 underperformed the market except for semiconductors. Capital is being drawn in by AI.

Austin Campbell: Before we get started, I want to share a conversation I had. I was talking with a friend who specializes in global macro—he’s one of the best traders I know. I asked him what he thought about Bitcoin, and he said it’s hard to envision the next wave of institutional adoption—pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, central banks—happening while Saylor holds 5% of Bitcoin and has such a massive personal presence. His exact words were: “Maybe the best thing would be for that guy to get liquidated, so the asset can really surge and everyone else can jump in.” Whenever someone becomes the face of the crypto market, their downfall seems inevitable. Strategy has been the face of this for some time now. I can’t help but wonder if, in some way, that makes them an obstacle to Bitcoin’s rise—and that itself creates their own problems.

Austin Campbell: Before diving into the main topic, I’d like to raise a broader question. Governments are now attempting to regulate cryptocurrency from a new angle—not by blocking the release of code, but by controlling who can access it. They aim to use export control laws to restrict access to information that has already been published under the First Amendment. This essentially amounts to picking winners and losers without any applicable law or due process.

National security is certainly important, but we cannot simply say "national security" and then close our eyes without asking why. We cannot tell people to build their financial lives using stablecoins and crypto rails, only to cut it all off in an instant due to national security or export controls. The crypto industry isn't angry enough about this—and this is our fight.

Austin Campbell: Let’s get to the point. Strategy sold 3,588 bitcoins, cashing out approximately $216 million. This is the largest sale to date, following a smaller sale of 32 bitcoins previously made to pay preferred dividends. The question is clear: Will selling bitcoins to cover dividends become routine now that the MSTR premium has disappeared? Is Strategy still a buyer, or has it become a regular seller?

Let’s start with the facts. They broke their long-standing policy of never selling, first selling 32 bitcoins, then another 3,588 bitcoins a month later. As of July 5, Strategy holds 843,775 bitcoins and $2.55 billion in cash reserves, with a cost basis of $75,700 per bitcoin—significantly higher than the current trading price of around $60,000. MSTR first dropped below $1 to 99 cents on June 27, before recovering somewhat. STRC fell as low as $74.57; when the show started, I saw it rebound to around $90. The dividend yield increased by 50 basis points to 12%. The new authorized framework permits the sale of up to $1.25 billion in bitcoins, in addition to STRC’s priority repurchase program.

Chris, you have an investment banking background; Ram, you’ve made many investments. Saylor has shifted to selling Bitcoin from the balance sheet rather than continuing to issue MSTR shares. What does this tell you?

Ram Ahluwalia: Two paths. Issue common stock—diluting MSTR and pushing the share price down. Or sell Bitcoin—undermining the narrative. Last week, we mentioned the possibility of a short squeeze rebound for MSTR, and we’ve seen news reflecting that. More constructively, STRC and STRF have begun moving toward par value over the past few days. They need to push back to par. If they succeed, they get breathing room; if not, it becomes a problem. I still view this as a trading asset, vulnerable to violent short squeeze rebounds, and we may currently be in the middle of one. I also want to compare the dates of Bitcoin sales with the announcement dates—if BTC holds firm or even rises during the selling period, that would be highly encouraging.

Last week in London, I first attended the Goldman Sachs event—packed to capacity, severely oversubscribed, with institutional adoption levels impossible to ignore. Then I went to the Robinhood event, where their DeFi initiatives were truly impressive. Before that, I had listened to Saylor’s speech twice. He took the stage with a sharp focus on defending and preserving preferred dividends, trying to convince the audience of his commitment to Bitcoin. He’s trying to navigate this three-body problem.

Austin Campbell: This also highlights the divide between bulls and bears. The bulls will say: mNAV has returned to 1.09, STRC is rebounding, and BTC rose this week despite selling pressure—Josh Mandel and Pete Rizzo both noted it behaved like a buyback. The bears will say: the premium is dead, BTC hasn’t truly rallied yet, and it’s now just a seller. Roland and Peter Schiff have both pointed this out. My question is: even if preferred shares have recovered significantly and Saylor can now sit still for a while, if BTC doesn’t rise, won’t we be back to square one in a year?

Ram Ahluwalia: My guess is that short-term traders entered to buy the dip last week when volume collapsed. That’s quick money, not long-term holding. They’ll likely sell to take profits.

Chris Perkins: From an investment banking perspective, when the mNAV premium disappears, the cycle of "printing shares to buy Bitcoin" breaks down. You can no longer issue shares freely because the market no longer offers you a premium. So you must look to the asset side for solutions. Selling Bitcoin is accounting-wise feasible—cost basis at $75,700, market price around $60,000, resulting in a book loss but cash recovery. The problem is that this action signals to the market: you no longer fully believe in your own thesis.

Chris Perkins: Unfortunately, we're stuck. The crypto narrative is currently stuck on MicroStrategy. Strategy isn't crypto, and crypto isn't Strategy, but we're all stuck here, feeling like we need to work through this before we can move forward. It reminds me of when I used to open Bloomberg and all they talked about every day was the PIGS—Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain—day after day, yet the market eventually moved on.

I’m ready to turn the page. I’m encouraged by BTC’s considerable resilience today. There are also some positive tailwinds—such as Trump expressing his fondness for crypto on the same day his account went live. I look forward to moving beyond this three-body problem and refocusing on fundamentals and the details of other projects. Crypto is Bitcoin, Bitcoin is crypto, so strategy is crypto—I hope to break this equation.

Another related debate emerging is: Where does value actually flow—to tokens or to equity? You see this in both private and public markets. Some dismissively claim, "All the value is in the equity; everything else is nonsense." I think it’s far more complex than that.

Austin Campbell: I think both can work, but the challenge is having both simultaneously—unless you carefully define the rights of each. We already have Delaware corporate law and centuries of capital structure. You can slice cash flows into different tiers of debt, and what remains after paying employees and creditors is equity. There’s no third category called “token” that can fit into this stack. You can let tokens act as equity or debt, but making them a new concept alongside debt and equity is difficult.

If you have common equity, the token would need to function more like preferred stock or debt to have independent meaning. If it’s just another form of equity, you might as well tokenize your equity directly. You can also tokenize products, services, or commodities—Pokémon cards are a good analogy. The company issuing the cards is separate from the cards themselves; you can tokenize a product without tokenizing equity.

Ram Ahluwalia: It depends on the specifics. From a decentralized technology perspective, things can vary—you can deploy frontends everywhere, and the governance logic for equity and tokens can be separated. In some projects, value clearly flows to the tokens, leaving equity as an empty shell. Venture capitalists often invest in both—holding both tokens and equity—to ensure they’re covered regardless of where the value ultimately flows. But to be honest, I can’t think of a clear success case where both tokens and equity coexist with stable value.

Chris Perkins: Some might ask whether this entire token experiment will, in hindsight, be seen as a product of the COVID-era $3 trillion stimulus and zero-interest-rate policy? We created twenty thousand tokens, didn’t know what they were, thought they represented governance and economic rights, only to end up back in traditional capitalism?

I don’t see it that way. You can’t deny that real utility is emerging: stablecoins are nearing all-time highs, perpetual futures markets are innovating, prediction markets are growing, and RWA and tokenized equity are being deployed. Goldman Sachs events are packed; Robinhood launched a DeFi app store—with 12 partners already, and many more to come—backed by Lloyd’s insurance, with risk abstracted in the background. The market is maturing.

Austin Campbell: Looking ahead ten years, 90% of the current top 500 tokens will disappear. Is this failure or success?

Ram Ahluwalia: If you put money into it, that’s a failure. I don’t think it’s 90%—I think it’s 99% that it goes to zero. The lesson hasn’t changed. Druckenmiller said during the dot-com bubble that he already knew the lesson and didn’t need to learn it again. These tokens have no value capture; the founding teams gain liquidity too early and have no incentive to stick around and run the project.

Austin Campbell: What are your thoughts on this set of developments—Circle being questioned by securities regulators, Robinhood entering the government money market, Tether’s moves, and the OUSD alliance?

Chris Perkins: I saw this coming long ago. Institutional greed is endless. If you're an exchange, there are a few ways to make money: data, trading fees, net interest income. Stablecoins are the new net interest income. Everyone is looking at Tether and thinking, “These guys are making so much money off such a basic product—how can I do the same?”

But the biggest challenge is utility. You can transfer it, but what can you actually do with a stablecoin? Can you buy a cup of coffee with it? Right now, it’s still a game of hot potato—I want to swap your stablecoin for mine, then you hold mine while I earn interest. The stablecoin war has begun, and it will get worse before it gets better. Eventually, consolidation will emerge. Looking back at the CLARITY Act, banks should push it through.

Austin Campbell: Stablecoins are often discussed as if they were a single product, but they are entirely different. Robinhood is trying to attract deposits and then deploy them into DeFi—that’s an investment and retail product strategy. In Europe, it’s more like a regulated payment strategy. Tether’s response was straightforward—they’re launching USAT (the U.S. version of Tether), interested in the U.S. economy, but Europe? "No bid." Tether sees this as soccer, not American football—they’re not playing by Europe’s rules. They’ve completely exited one market. You’ve seen them being delisted on some exchanges, and Revolut has also removed them. Tether’s response: As expected. BNP Paribas can’t afford not to do business in France, but Tether can.

OUSD is a "plan without a plan." A coalition of 140 members with entirely different economic goals, with details left unfinished. You claim the issuer retains economic gains, but how is this tracked? Who minted the tokens? On which platform are the tokens issued? How are they handled in DeFi? If it’s based on who mints them, can’t I immediately set up a trading team to redeem others’ OUSD and mint my own? The hardest part—governance—has been skipped, and the technology is being launched first.

Coinbase is also involved with OUSD, but it’s smart not to put all your eggs in Circle’s basket. If this were a serious business alliance requiring you to make OUSD your primary product, Coinbase would likely not be involved. So they’re covering both sides.

Ram Ahluwalia: "Move fast and break things" is a winning formula in the tech industry. Elon Musk blew up countless rockets to reach SpaceX’s current level. But moving fast and breaking things with other people’s money—isn’t that criminal? OUSD was launched like a torpedo, but some partners faced backlash before even boarding—the dark side of tech culture colliding with financial culture.

Austin Campbell: Will banks issue stablecoins? I think they will. In an ideal world, banks hold deposits for domestic use—loans are real. Deposit rates might rise, but repo rates fall, leaving net funding costs flat. But you’d also want stablecoins because deposits and stablecoins serve different purposes—just as stocks aren’t bonds. Customers have deposits and want to send money internationally to recipients outside the banking system—they can use stablecoins, but not deposits.

Ironically, Bank of America could issue a stablecoin backed by its own deposits—giving you the best of both worlds. If CLARITY didn’t cap yields, they’d actually be grateful.

Ram Ahluwalia: They will rush in and partner with customers who have distribution channels. Look at Zelle’s success—Zelle gave large banks an advantage. Similarly, the stablecoin framework gives large banks an edge over regional banks. Regional banks have yet to respond competitively.

More importantly, Scott Bessent has repeatedly emphasized that stablecoins are essentially a recycling of the Eurodollar market. If JPMorgan or Bank of America issued stablecoins, they could now earn NIM directly from Thai merchants or Chinese suppliers. Among the four major U.S. banks—JPMorgan, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and Bank of America—only Citigroup has a true international distribution network. The other three cannot earn money from their customers’ customers. Stablecoins change that.

Chris Perkins: Don’t underestimate JPMorgan. Their e-commerce business is substantial, with distribution channels connected to these platforms. They can do what Meta tried to do with Diem and Libra—but using their own framework and bringing in multiple banks. If the Democrats take control of the House, they’ll have a sympathetic ear in Elizabeth Warren. JPMorgan could become the first bank with a $1 trillion market cap. They’re already worth over $900 billion and spend $13–16 billion annually on technology. They’re acutely aware of disruption—they’ve all seen how fractional trading and zero-commission trading are impacting their profit margins.

Banks already have "stablecoins"—they’re called deposits. People give you dollars, you keep most of the interest, and occasionally pay some back. But the problem is, bank deposits only work within their own network. Stablecoins allow JPMorgan to earn money from customers of customers around the world, not just from its own customers.

Austin Campbell: ZUSD is already a registered code—they’re working on a stablecoin. But to be more direct: the biggest losers in the dollar stablecoin space may be non-U.S. banks offering U.S. dollar deposit accounts. If I can now buy a stablecoin directly instead of opening a dollar account through my local bank—where exchange rates are typically poor and fees are high—those services become obsolete. And it’s no longer just serving ultra-high-net-worth clients.

If we're talking about losers, dollar-stablecoins are good for the four major U.S. banks; losers would likely be institutions like UBS.

Chris Perkins: Any product that says, "You give me dollars, I give you back dollars, but I keep the interest forever," is a good product.

Austin Campbell: Tell us about Securitize’s recent IPO. Q1 revenue grew 39% year-over-year, but they lost $7 million. Market cap is $1.8 billion. What do you think?

Chris Perkins: Securitize’s current trading resembles a call option. You’re not saying, “I think it’s worth $180 million now,” you’re saying, “I think there’s a 10% chance it’ll be worth $18 billion in the future, and a 90% chance it’ll be worth nothing—acquired at a low price or fail.” The high volatility is evidence of this.

Ram Ahluwalia: Looking at the broader IPO trend, IPOs over $1 billion have almost always seen a 50% pullback in their first year. If you want to hold Securitize, the right approach might be to place a low-limit order and wait. Circle is also nearing its low point, but it has a genuine moat. Meanwhile, Ripple has obtained a MiCA license—issued by Luxembourg, with passporting rights—but this won’t provide much short-term benefit to XRP or RLUSD.

Ram Ahluwalia: Last quarter, every sector in the S&P 500 underperformed the market except semiconductors. Capital is being heavily drawn into AI. But over the past two weeks, you’ve seen quality stocks begin to rebound—Progressive, Allstate, Berkshire Hathaway, S&P Global, Moody’s. World-class companies are on sale.

Austin Campbell: This should be good for crypto—back to fundamentals. Assets generating revenue are rising. BTC is back at $64K, Hyperliquid at $71.35. Ultimately, everything returns to fundamentals and cash flow.