Malicious JavaScript code snippets were embedded on the websites of 178 institutions.
This vulnerability exploit originated from Optimizely’s Web Experimentation platform, a tool used by many large companies for A/B testing—showing users multiple versions of a page to determine which performs better.
Report URI estimates that, as of November 16, 188 out of the 1,611 Optimizely code snippets it crawled contained this malicious code, though the actual number is likely higher.
Websites potentially affected by this attack include several well-known global organizations: Zoom, BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, and Peacock. BleepingComputer confirmed that this script loads on many of these websites.
What does this script do?
At its core, this script aims to replace the wallet address on the page with the attacker’s wallet address, while also stealing credit card numbers, capturing screenshots of the page, and more. It is a comprehensive toolkit designed to steal personal data, wallets, and other assets.
According to Report URI, the attacker’s wallet received approximately $7,040 within the first nine hours. Given the scale of the involved institutions, this amount is relatively low, though the total losses from card fraud remain unknown. Later that day, the attacker added a card skimmer and attempted to load an iOS exploit chain on older iPhone models via a hidden iframe.
Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation product to inject malicious JavaScript into some customers' projects. The exact mechanism of how the vulnerability was exploited remains under investigation.
What does this mean for the crypto industry?
If the attack escalates, it could become one of the largest supply chain attacks we’ve ever seen. Given that this attack originated from a third-party service provider, widespread service migrations may occur globally, as it is now difficult to fully trust third-party services and libraries when they are accessed via APIs.
Cryptocurrency services often delegate certain tasks to third-party providers, so it is not unlikely for similar situations to arise in this field.
For product owners, the author recommends exercising caution and reevaluating services that are vulnerable to exploitation; for users, the author advises staying vigilant and avoiding putting all your eggs in one basket.

