CoinMarketCap reports — On August 24, vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz dropped to just two ships per day, the lowest level in three months. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard announced an agreement with Oman on revenue sharing from the strait, but made reopening contingent upon the United States fulfilling the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. Trump claimed the strait is open, contradicting clear shipping data. The U.S. has expanded secondary sanctions on Iran but deferred their implementation. Brent crude has fallen below $88, yet remains up over 40% this year.
CoinMarketCap APP reports — Transit volumes through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy chokepoint, have fallen to their lowest level in three months. On August 26, Iran's Revolutionary Guard announced an agreement with Oman on the proportion of controlled waters and revenue sharing in the strait, but emphasized that the strait will not reopen unless the United States ceases its "obstruction" and fulfills the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. On the same day, U.S. President Trump stated there is "no timetable" for Iran's return to negotiations. This article systematically analyzes this geopolitical economic struggle, which impacts global energy dynamics, based on the latest shipping data, official statements, and market developments.
Latest data from shipping tracker Kpler shows that only two commercial vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz on August 24—one very large gas carrier and one very large crude oil carrier entering from the Gulf of Oman, far below the 14-vessel daily average over the past 10 days and the lowest level since early May. Preliminary data for August 25 (Tuesday) indicates that five commodity vessels passed through, still significantly below the 10-day average of 15.
Independent data from another vessel tracking firm, Vortexa, corroborates this trend: during the week of August 23, oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz remained in the range of 6 to 7 million barrels per day, far below normal capacity levels prior to the outbreak of conflict.
Before the conflict erupted, the Strait of Hormuz accounted for about one-fifth of global crude oil and liquefied natural gas transportation volumes. The sharp decline in current shipping traffic means that millions of barrels of crude oil per day are unable to reach international markets through normal channels.
It is worth noting that actual traffic data may be higher than monitored figures, as some vessels disable their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders while en route. Approximately 80% of vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz over the past two weeks did so with their AIS turned off. This phenomenon of “stealth transit” itself underscores the high level of uncertainty surrounding passage through the strait.
Agreement terms and negotiation progress
On August 26, Hossein Mohibi, spokesperson for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, told the semi-official Tasnim News Agency that Iran and Oman have reached a “mutually acceptable agreement” on the proportion of controlled waters and revenue sharing in the Strait of Hormuz. Negotiations, which began about a month ago, covered the respective shares of controlled waters and revenue distribution arrangements between the two countries. However, Mohibi did not disclose details such as the specific proportions, sources of revenue, fee structures, or the effective date of the agreement.
On the previous day (August 25), Oman’s Foreign Minister Bader visited Tehran and, following talks with Iran’s Foreign Minister Alireza, issued a joint statement proposing a phased plan to restore safe navigation: both sides intend to establish a mutually agreed temporary maritime corridor, cooperate in mine clearance, and have their technical experts continue consultations on permanent shipping lanes, traffic management, intelligence sharing, and arrangements for shipping and security services.
Reopening condition: The United States must “fulfill its obligations”
Muhbib clearly stated that whether the strait can fully reopen depends on whether the United States halts its "obstruction" and fulfills the previously signed Memorandum of Understanding in Islamabad. This memorandum, reached between the United States and Iran in June of this year, includes key provisions such as terminating military operations, initiating 60-day negotiations for a final agreement, and gradually lifting the U.S. maritime blockade on Iranian ports; in return, Iran has committed to ensuring free and safe passage for commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz during the transition period.
The memo also stated that Iran must remove obstacles such as mines affecting navigation, while the United States must lift sanctions, permit Iranian oil exports, and release frozen assets. However, both the U.S. and Iran subsequently accused each other of failing to fully honor their commitments, leaving the issue of reopening the strait in deadlock. The 60-day negotiation window expired on August 17.
Muhibi also claimed that the Strait of Hormuz is currently "under Iranian control," and that "all enemy warships" have been withdrawn to at least 400 kilometers away from the strait, with even the waterways near the Omani side under Iranian control.
The contrast between Trump's optimistic narrative and the reality of the data
On August 26, U.S. President Trump, in an interview with Qatar’s Al Jazeera, said he had “no timetable” for when Iran would return to negotiations and that he was “not in a hurry.” When asked whether economic measures were more effective than military strikes, Trump replied, “I think both are effective.”
The previous day (August 25), Trump insisted during an interview with conservative radio host Glenn Beck that the strait was “already open”: “We have a lot of ships going through the strait right now. We’re sending them in… Occasionally, drones or rockets are launched, but it’s a very well-functioning strait. A lot of oil is flowing out.” He also claimed that 10 million barrels of oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz on Tuesday.
However, this optimistic statement contrasts significantly with data from independent shipping tracking firms such as Kpler and Vortexa—daily vessel traffic of only 2 to 5 commodity ships is hard to reconcile with claims of “large volumes of oil flowing out.”
"Economic D-Day": Deterrence and Suspension of Secondary Sanctions
On August 24, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the launch of a new round of economic pressure measures against Iran, codenamed "Operation Economic Outcast," describing the initiative as the "Economic D-Day" against Iran.
The new measures will expand the scope of secondary sanctions to include digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping as key targets. The U.S. Department of the Treasury also released a list of 60 individuals, entities, and vessels. Bessent warned that any country or entity aligned with Iran or maintaining commercial ties with it could be excluded from the U.S. dollar system.
However, the United States has not yet imposed significant secondary sanctions on other countries—including Chinese financial institutions accused of assisting Iran’s oil trade. Bessent said, “Why would I blow up the global financial system? We believe it’s important to set benchmarks and give people a window to correct their behavior, but they should know this will move quickly, and we are serious.”
International oil prices continued their downward trend this week, with a cumulative decline of nearly 6%. As of Asian trading on August 27, Brent crude futures were trading around $86.36 per barrel; WTI crude futures were trading around $81.66 per barrel.
Major factors pressuring oil prices include: progress in negotiations between Iran and Oman has eased concerns about supply disruptions; the newly announced U.S. sanctions were less stringent than market expectations—the White House has not yet imposed stricter secondary sanctions on Iran’s trading partners; and reports indicate that the U.S. has begun returning diplomats to Gulf countries, signaling that Washington does not currently anticipate military escalation.
Nevertheless, oil prices have risen more than 40% year to date, reflecting supply disruptions caused by conflicts in the Persian Gulf over the past six months. Brent crude has fallen approximately 39% from its annual high of $118 per barrel set on March 31.
The current博弈 in the Strait of Hormuz reveals three structural contradictions. First, although Iran and Oman have reached an agreement on revenue sharing from the strait, Tehran has tightly linked the strait’s reopening to Washington’s compliance, effectively turning regional diplomatic achievements into leverage against the U.S. Second, while the Trump administration has loudly declared the strait “open” and promoted the notion of an “economic D-Day,” it has simultaneously delayed implementing the most potent secondary sanctions, creating a significant gap between rhetoric and action—this strategy of “coexisting deterrence and restraint” reflects Washington’s dilemma in balancing maximum pressure with global financial stability. Third, the discrepancy between shipping data and official statements (two vessels per day versus claims of “large volumes of oil flowing out”) underscores how information warfare has become a critical dimension of this geopolitical struggle.
For the global energy market, the daily supply gap of millions of barrels through the Strait of Hormuz cannot be easily filled in the short term. Although oil prices have fallen nearly 40% from their yearly highs, they remain elevated compared to pre-conflict levels. The ultimate outcome of the strait’s navigation depends on three key variables: whether the U.S. and Iran can reach a compliance consensus under the framework of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding; whether secondary U.S. sanctions will be genuinely enforced after the end of the “cure period”; and whether the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ actual control over the strait will further escalate. These three uncertainties will continue to dominate the direction of global energy price volatility over the coming weeks.
Question 1: What exactly does the "revenue sharing agreement" between Iran and Oman refer to? Are tolls really going to be introduced in the strait?
Answer: The agreement refers to the consensus reached between Iran and Oman regarding the respective shares of waters they control in the Strait of Hormuz and the associated revenue distribution. The Revolutionary Guard spokesperson did not disclose specific proportions, fee structures, or effective dates. Analysts believe this revenue-sharing agreement suggests Iran plans to implement some form of transit fee mechanism. However, it should be noted that Oman has not independently confirmed that a final agreement on revenue sharing has been reached. More importantly, Iran has clearly stated that even if the agreement is signed, the strait will not immediately reopen—the reopening is contingent upon the United States ceasing its “obstruction” and fulfilling the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.
Question 2: What is the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding? Why does it determine whether the strait can be reopened?
Answer: The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding is an agreement remotely signed by the United States and Iran in June 2026, with key provisions including: both parties ceasing military operations, initiating a 60-day negotiation period for a final agreement, the United States gradually lifting its maritime blockade on Iranian ports, and Iran committing to ensure the safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz during the transition period. The memorandum also stipulates that Iran will clear mines and other navigational hazards, while the United States must lift sanctions, permit Iranian oil exports, and release frozen assets. However, the 60-day window expired on August 17, with both sides accusing each other of failing to fulfill their commitments. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard has explicitly stated that the strait will only reopen once the United States "stops obstructing" and fulfills the memorandum.
Question 3: Trump said the strait "has been opened" and "a lot of oil is flowing out"—does this contradict shipping data?
Answer: Indeed, there is a significant discrepancy. Data from the independent shipping tracker Kpler shows that only two commercial vessels passed through the strait on August 24, and five on August 25—far below the 10-day average of 14 to 15 vessels. Oil shipments have dropped to just 6 to 7 million barrels per day, well below pre-conflict levels. However, two factors should be noted: first, approximately 80% of vessels have turned off their AIS transponders to "stealth" transit, meaning actual numbers may be slightly higher; second, Trump’s claim of “10 million barrels” may include shipments under military escort or special arrangements. Overall, there is a clear gap between official statements and commercial data.
Question 4: How severe are the secondary sanctions of the U.S. "economic expulsion campaign"? Why have they not been implemented yet?
Answer: The action, announced by Treasury Secretary Bentsen on August 24, was described as the “economic D-Day” against Iran. The new measures expand secondary sanctions to five sectors: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping, and include a list of 60 individuals/entities. Any country, bank, or company continuing transactions with Iran may be excluded from the U.S. dollar system. However, the U.S. has so far refrained from imposing major secondary sanctions on other countries—particularly China. Bentsen explained that this approach sets a benchmark and provides a “remediation period” to allow parties time to cease dealings with Iran, reflecting the U.S. balancing act between maximum pressure and avoiding “the collapse of the global financial system.”
Question 5: What is the actual impact of the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz on global oil prices?
Answer: Before the conflict erupted, the Strait of Hormuz accounted for about one-fifth of global crude oil transportation. The current daily volume of 6 to 7 million barrels implies a significant supply gap. On August 27, Brent crude was priced at $87 per barrel, down approximately 40% from the yearly high of $118 per barrel on March 31, but still up over 40% year-to-date. Recent downward pressure on oil prices stems largely from market expectations that the Iran-Oman agreement could lead to the strait’s reopening; however, whether this expectation materializes depends entirely on the trajectory of U.S.-Iran negotiations. If the strait remains closed for an extended period, oil prices will face substantial upward revaluation pressure.
At 10:34 Beijing Time, Brent crude is trading at $86.41 per barrel.
I. Aviation data plummets sharply: Global energy arteries nearly "blocked"
Latest data from shipping tracker Kpler shows that only two commercial vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz on August 24—one very large gas carrier and one very large crude oil carrier entering from the Gulf of Oman, far below the 14-vessel daily average over the past 10 days and the lowest level since early May. Preliminary data for August 25 (Tuesday) indicates that five commodity vessels passed through, still significantly below the 10-day average of 15.
Independent data from another vessel tracking firm, Vortexa, corroborates this trend: during the week of August 23, oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz remained in the range of 6 to 7 million barrels per day, far below normal capacity levels prior to the outbreak of conflict.
Before the conflict erupted, the Strait of Hormuz accounted for about one-fifth of global crude oil and liquefied natural gas transportation volumes. The sharp decline in current shipping traffic means that millions of barrels of crude oil per day are unable to reach international markets through normal channels.
It is worth noting that actual traffic data may be higher than monitored figures, as some vessels disable their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders while en route. Approximately 80% of vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz over the past two weeks did so with their AIS turned off. This phenomenon of “stealth transit” itself underscores the high level of uncertainty surrounding passage through the strait.
II. Iran-Oman Agreement: Revenue Sharing Has Been Settled, but Reopening Conditions Target the United States
Agreement terms and negotiation progress
On August 26, Hossein Mohibi, spokesperson for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, told the semi-official Tasnim News Agency that Iran and Oman have reached a “mutually acceptable agreement” on the proportion of controlled waters and revenue sharing in the Strait of Hormuz. Negotiations, which began about a month ago, covered the respective shares of controlled waters and revenue distribution arrangements between the two countries. However, Mohibi did not disclose details such as the specific proportions, sources of revenue, fee structures, or the effective date of the agreement.
On the previous day (August 25), Oman’s Foreign Minister Bader visited Tehran and, following talks with Iran’s Foreign Minister Alireza, issued a joint statement proposing a phased plan to restore safe navigation: both sides intend to establish a mutually agreed temporary maritime corridor, cooperate in mine clearance, and have their technical experts continue consultations on permanent shipping lanes, traffic management, intelligence sharing, and arrangements for shipping and security services.
Reopening condition: The United States must “fulfill its obligations”
Muhbib clearly stated that whether the strait can fully reopen depends on whether the United States halts its "obstruction" and fulfills the previously signed Memorandum of Understanding in Islamabad. This memorandum, reached between the United States and Iran in June of this year, includes key provisions such as terminating military operations, initiating 60-day negotiations for a final agreement, and gradually lifting the U.S. maritime blockade on Iranian ports; in return, Iran has committed to ensuring free and safe passage for commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz during the transition period.
The memo also stated that Iran must remove obstacles such as mines affecting navigation, while the United States must lift sanctions, permit Iranian oil exports, and release frozen assets. However, both the U.S. and Iran subsequently accused each other of failing to fully honor their commitments, leaving the issue of reopening the strait in deadlock. The 60-day negotiation window expired on August 17.
Muhibi also claimed that the Strait of Hormuz is currently "under Iranian control," and that "all enemy warships" have been withdrawn to at least 400 kilometers away from the strait, with even the waterways near the Omani side under Iranian control.
III. U.S. Position: Trump says "the strait is open," with no timeline for returning to negotiations
The contrast between Trump's optimistic narrative and the reality of the data
On August 26, U.S. President Trump, in an interview with Qatar’s Al Jazeera, said he had “no timetable” for when Iran would return to negotiations and that he was “not in a hurry.” When asked whether economic measures were more effective than military strikes, Trump replied, “I think both are effective.”
The previous day (August 25), Trump insisted during an interview with conservative radio host Glenn Beck that the strait was “already open”: “We have a lot of ships going through the strait right now. We’re sending them in… Occasionally, drones or rockets are launched, but it’s a very well-functioning strait. A lot of oil is flowing out.” He also claimed that 10 million barrels of oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz on Tuesday.
However, this optimistic statement contrasts significantly with data from independent shipping tracking firms such as Kpler and Vortexa—daily vessel traffic of only 2 to 5 commodity ships is hard to reconcile with claims of “large volumes of oil flowing out.”
"Economic D-Day": Deterrence and Suspension of Secondary Sanctions
On August 24, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the launch of a new round of economic pressure measures against Iran, codenamed "Operation Economic Outcast," describing the initiative as the "Economic D-Day" against Iran.
The new measures will expand the scope of secondary sanctions to include digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping as key targets. The U.S. Department of the Treasury also released a list of 60 individuals, entities, and vessels. Bessent warned that any country or entity aligned with Iran or maintaining commercial ties with it could be excluded from the U.S. dollar system.
However, the United States has not yet imposed significant secondary sanctions on other countries—including Chinese financial institutions accused of assisting Iran’s oil trade. Bessent said, “Why would I blow up the global financial system? We believe it’s important to set benchmarks and give people a window to correct their behavior, but they should know this will move quickly, and we are serious.”
Four: Market Reaction: Oil Prices Continue to Decline, Brent Falls Below $88
International oil prices continued their downward trend this week, with a cumulative decline of nearly 6%. As of Asian trading on August 27, Brent crude futures were trading around $86.36 per barrel; WTI crude futures were trading around $81.66 per barrel.
Major factors pressuring oil prices include: progress in negotiations between Iran and Oman has eased concerns about supply disruptions; the newly announced U.S. sanctions were less stringent than market expectations—the White House has not yet imposed stricter secondary sanctions on Iran’s trading partners; and reports indicate that the U.S. has begun returning diplomats to Gulf countries, signaling that Washington does not currently anticipate military escalation.
Nevertheless, oil prices have risen more than 40% year to date, reflecting supply disruptions caused by conflicts in the Persian Gulf over the past six months. Brent crude has fallen approximately 39% from its annual high of $118 per barrel set on March 31.
[Editor's Summary]
The current博弈 in the Strait of Hormuz reveals three structural contradictions. First, although Iran and Oman have reached an agreement on revenue sharing from the strait, Tehran has tightly linked the strait’s reopening to Washington’s compliance, effectively turning regional diplomatic achievements into leverage against the U.S. Second, while the Trump administration has loudly declared the strait “open” and promoted the notion of an “economic D-Day,” it has simultaneously delayed implementing the most potent secondary sanctions, creating a significant gap between rhetoric and action—this strategy of “coexisting deterrence and restraint” reflects Washington’s dilemma in balancing maximum pressure with global financial stability. Third, the discrepancy between shipping data and official statements (two vessels per day versus claims of “large volumes of oil flowing out”) underscores how information warfare has become a critical dimension of this geopolitical struggle.
For the global energy market, the daily supply gap of millions of barrels through the Strait of Hormuz cannot be easily filled in the short term. Although oil prices have fallen nearly 40% from their yearly highs, they remain elevated compared to pre-conflict levels. The ultimate outcome of the strait’s navigation depends on three key variables: whether the U.S. and Iran can reach a compliance consensus under the framework of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding; whether secondary U.S. sanctions will be genuinely enforced after the end of the “cure period”; and whether the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ actual control over the strait will further escalate. These three uncertainties will continue to dominate the direction of global energy price volatility over the coming weeks.
[Frequently Asked Questions]
Question 1: What exactly does the "revenue sharing agreement" between Iran and Oman refer to? Are tolls really going to be introduced in the strait?
Answer: The agreement refers to the consensus reached between Iran and Oman regarding the respective shares of waters they control in the Strait of Hormuz and the associated revenue distribution. The Revolutionary Guard spokesperson did not disclose specific proportions, fee structures, or effective dates. Analysts believe this revenue-sharing agreement suggests Iran plans to implement some form of transit fee mechanism. However, it should be noted that Oman has not independently confirmed that a final agreement on revenue sharing has been reached. More importantly, Iran has clearly stated that even if the agreement is signed, the strait will not immediately reopen—the reopening is contingent upon the United States ceasing its “obstruction” and fulfilling the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.
Question 2: What is the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding? Why does it determine whether the strait can be reopened?
Answer: The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding is an agreement remotely signed by the United States and Iran in June 2026, with key provisions including: both parties ceasing military operations, initiating a 60-day negotiation period for a final agreement, the United States gradually lifting its maritime blockade on Iranian ports, and Iran committing to ensure the safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz during the transition period. The memorandum also stipulates that Iran will clear mines and other navigational hazards, while the United States must lift sanctions, permit Iranian oil exports, and release frozen assets. However, the 60-day window expired on August 17, with both sides accusing each other of failing to fulfill their commitments. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard has explicitly stated that the strait will only reopen once the United States "stops obstructing" and fulfills the memorandum.
Question 3: Trump said the strait "has been opened" and "a lot of oil is flowing out"—does this contradict shipping data?
Answer: Indeed, there is a significant discrepancy. Data from the independent shipping tracker Kpler shows that only two commercial vessels passed through the strait on August 24, and five on August 25—far below the 10-day average of 14 to 15 vessels. Oil shipments have dropped to just 6 to 7 million barrels per day, well below pre-conflict levels. However, two factors should be noted: first, approximately 80% of vessels have turned off their AIS transponders to "stealth" transit, meaning actual numbers may be slightly higher; second, Trump’s claim of “10 million barrels” may include shipments under military escort or special arrangements. Overall, there is a clear gap between official statements and commercial data.
Question 4: How severe are the secondary sanctions of the U.S. "economic expulsion campaign"? Why have they not been implemented yet?
Answer: The action, announced by Treasury Secretary Bentsen on August 24, was described as the “economic D-Day” against Iran. The new measures expand secondary sanctions to five sectors: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping, and include a list of 60 individuals/entities. Any country, bank, or company continuing transactions with Iran may be excluded from the U.S. dollar system. However, the U.S. has so far refrained from imposing major secondary sanctions on other countries—particularly China. Bentsen explained that this approach sets a benchmark and provides a “remediation period” to allow parties time to cease dealings with Iran, reflecting the U.S. balancing act between maximum pressure and avoiding “the collapse of the global financial system.”
Question 5: What is the actual impact of the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz on global oil prices?
Answer: Before the conflict erupted, the Strait of Hormuz accounted for about one-fifth of global crude oil transportation. The current daily volume of 6 to 7 million barrels implies a significant supply gap. On August 27, Brent crude was priced at $87 per barrel, down approximately 40% from the yearly high of $118 per barrel on March 31, but still up over 40% year-to-date. Recent downward pressure on oil prices stems largely from market expectations that the Iran-Oman agreement could lead to the strait’s reopening; however, whether this expectation materializes depends entirely on the trajectory of U.S.-Iran negotiations. If the strait remains closed for an extended period, oil prices will face substantial upward revaluation pressure.
At 10:34 Beijing Time, Brent crude is trading at $86.41 per barrel.