Source | LetterRank
Authors | Yuan Xinyue, Wang Jing
On July 29, SpaceX's stock dropped intraday to $107.01, a decline of more than 20% from its IPO offering price of $135 and over 50% from its post-listing high of $225.64.
Based on its peak valuation of approximately $2.6 trillion at its initial listing, SpaceX's market value has evaporated by about $1.2 trillion, equivalent to losing an entire Tesla.
On the other hand, the day after Tesla announced its second-quarter earnings, Tesla's stock closed down 14.52% at $319.69, marking its largest single-day decline in over a year; the company’s market value lost approximately $214.5 billion (about RMB 1.5 trillion) in a single day, making it the worst-performing stock in the S&P 500 that day. As of now, Tesla’s stock has not recovered and remains about 18% lower than before the earnings announcement.
Looking solely at revenue and delivery data, this earnings report is not poor. In the second quarter, Tesla delivered 480,126 vehicles globally, setting a new record for the same period; revenue reached $28.24 billion, a 26% year-over-year increase, also exceeding market expectations.
But market focus has shifted: with continued increased investment in AI, Robotaxi, Optimus, and related infrastructure, Tesla's second-quarter capital expenditures reached $5.8 billion, and free cash flow turned negative at -$1.1 billion—the first quarterly negative free cash flow in over two years. Meanwhile, the company maintains its guidance of over $25 billion in capital expenditures for the full year.
In addition to cash flow, two other pieces of information are worth noting.
Based on the breakdown of cumulative paid passenger miles disclosed in Tesla's earnings report, the Robotaxi fleet added approximately 700,000 paid operating miles in the second quarter of this year, down from approximately 1.1 million miles in the first quarter, a sequential decline of about 36%.
During the quarterly earnings call, Musk stated that when discussing the Cybercab deployment plan, Tesla will first use Cybercab test vehicles equipped with steering wheels and pedals to accumulate driving data, then gradually expand the deployment of steering-wheel-free versions. This indicates that although Tesla currently has approximately 10 million vehicles on the road continuously collecting real-world driving data, the Cybercab, as a new vehicle platform, cannot directly rely on data from existing models and still needs to complete data collection and validation specific to its own platform.
Capital markets are willing to assign Tesla a valuation far higher than that of traditional automakers, not primarily because of how many cars it sells, but because they believe Robotaxi and Optimus will drive the next phase of growth. One of the most important logic points behind Robotaxi is that Tesla can leverage its nearly 10 million vehicles to continuously collect real-world road data, steadily enhancing its autonomous driving capabilities and ultimately creating a self-reinforcing data flywheel.
But the issues exposed this time have led the market to question: To what extent can Tesla’s long-emphasized data flywheel support the future of Robotaxi?
Robotaxi has always been one of the most important narratives in Tesla’s valuation framework.
This story is built on a very simple logic: Tesla owns the world's largest fleet of smart cars.
As of the second quarter of this year, approximately 10 million vehicles are continuously operating on roads worldwide, with nearly 1.5 million paying FSD (Full Self-Driving) users globally. Every day, vast amounts of real-world road data are continuously fed back to train autonomous driving models.
Elon Musk has also repeatedly emphasized that Tesla's true competitive advantage is not LiDAR or high-definition maps, but this fleet continuously generating real-world driving data. Once sufficient data is accumulated, FSD capabilities will continuously improve, eventually forming a Robotaxi network that attracts more vehicles to join and generate even more data, creating a self-reinforcing data flywheel.
According to this narrative, as real-world road data continues to grow, Robotaxis should enter a phase of sustained expansion.
However, analyzing the breakdown of Tesla's disclosed cumulative Robotaxi mileage data, analysts found that newly added paid miles in the second quarter totaled approximately 700,000 miles, a decrease of about 36% compared to approximately 1.1 million miles in the first quarter.
It should be noted that Tesla’s latest earnings report shows the cumulative paid operating mileage of Robotaxi, not quarterly operating data—according to the chart, the cumulative mileage continues to rise, suggesting the Robotaxi business is still growing. In other words, the cumulative figures obscure changes in the quarterly operating pace, while the breakdown into quarterly data reveals a different picture.
Robotaxis have long been described as a business capable of self-reinforcement through fleet size, data, and operational scale: as coverage expands to more cities and the number of vehicles grows, paid miles and real-world road data should also increase. However, second-quarter operational data shows that this narrative has not yet unfolded at the expected pace.
Meanwhile, a response from Musk during this earnings call added a premise to this story that had not been sufficiently discussed before.
Regarding the Cybercab deployment plan, he stated that Tesla will first continue gathering driving data and calibrating the Cybercab chassis using test vehicles equipped with steering wheels and pedals, before rapidly expanding the deployment of the steering-wheel-free version.
Although any autonomous driving company must complete testing and validation for a new platform when launching a new vehicle, applying this judgment to the Cybercab makes it hard not to reconsider its valuation.
After all, for Tesla, the Cybercab is not an ordinary vehicle.
When Tesla unveiled the Cybercab in 2024, its positioning was clear: it has no steering wheel or pedals and is designed specifically for fully autonomous operation. Musk initially estimated that the Cybercab would cost less than $30,000 and begin production in 2026.
More importantly, the Cybercab embodies Tesla’s vision for the ultimate form of a Robotaxi. As early as Autonomy Day in 2019, Musk stated that the true Robotaxi of the future would no longer require a steering wheel or pedals (“There will not be steering wheels, pedals.”), and would be capable of autonomously accepting ride requests, picking up and dropping off passengers, and completing the entire operational process without any human driver involvement.
In comparison, the Model Y currently operating Robotaxi services in Austin still retains a steering wheel and pedals, and each vehicle is equipped with a safety supervisor, indicating a clear gap from the final形态 envisioned by Musk.
In other words, the current Model Y Robotaxi is primarily serving to validate the Robotaxi operational system; the Cybercab, however, is the core platform Tesla aims to use to realize its autonomous ride-hailing business model.
It is precisely for this reason that Musk's statement that "the Cybercab still needs to accumulate its own driving data" is particularly noteworthy.
It indicates that Tesla’s accumulated real-world driving data over the past decade does not allow the Cybercab to bypass the validation phase. Moving from the Model Y to the Cybercab is not a simple software migration; for Tesla, which has long emphasized the “data flywheel,” this means the data it has gathered cannot be infinitely or costlessly replicated across every new platform generation.
For capital markets, this means the timeline for Robotaxi realization may continue to be pushed back.
In fact, this is not the first time the market has waited for Tesla to deliver on its Robotaxi.
In 2019, Musk stated that 1 million Robotaxis would be in operation by the end of 2020; in the following years, he repeatedly predicted that Tesla would achieve true autonomous driving the next year. However, as of 2025, Tesla only launched a limited-range Robotaxi service in Austin, Texas, and is still in the early stage of expanding to a few cities with small fleets.
The pie Musk has been serving is starting to feel hard to satisfy.
The slowdown in robotaxi expansion is just one part of the test facing Tesla’s valuation logic.
Over the past few years, Tesla has been able to maintain a valuation far higher than traditional automakers not just because it produces and sells electric vehicles, but because of the new business opportunities represented by Robotaxi, Optimus, and its AI capabilities.
These businesses have not yet generated scaled revenue or profits, but are believed to have the potential to reshape transportation, labor, and manufacturing in the future.
For years, Musk has described Robotaxi and Optimus as Tesla’s most important future businesses. In 2024, he even stated that Optimus could potentially take Tesla to a $5 trillion valuation; the new compensation plan unveiled in 2025 further lists 1 million Robotaxis, 1 million Optimus units, along with profit and market capitalization targets, as core performance metrics.
In other words, Tesla’s valuation is no longer based solely on how many cars it sells today, but also on the potential profits these new businesses can generate in the future.
But now, these stories are gradually moving from conceptual demonstrations to commercial validation.
Robotaxis have already begun offering paid services; the market is now looking not only at whether vehicles can achieve autonomous driving, but also at whether the fleet can continue to expand, whether operational mileage can accelerate, and when this service will generate real revenue and profits.
Optimus faces a more direct challenge.
In 2024, Musk stated that he hoped over 1,000 Optimus robots would be performing useful work at Tesla factories by 2025; he later further proposed a goal of producing tens of thousands of Optimus units by 2025. However, as of the second quarter of this year, Optimus is still primarily used for internal training, data collection, and feature development.
Tesla stated in its latest earnings report that the first-generation Optimus production line is being installed, with full-scale production expected to begin later this year; Musk also cautioned that early output will be very slow, as many of the robot’s approximately 10,000 components require supply chain redesigns.
In other words, what the market can currently see are still primarily demonstrations, production plans, and long-term capacity targets; Optimus has not yet reached a commercial stage where it can be measured by orders, pricing, and gross margins.
Meanwhile, AI as a productive force is beginning to enter Tesla’s ROI management.
According to The Information, Tesla has limited employees' spending on external AI tools to $200 per week per person starting July 6, with additional approvals required for any excess. This move indicates that even within this most AI-focused company, external AI tools are now being treated as a cost center: usage alone no longer equates to productivity, and investments must be justified by their returns.
Changes in the focus of capital markets are directly reflected in shareholder questions.
The question with the highest number of votes on Tesla's official investor Q&A platform this quarter directly questioned why the company has failed to meet its short-term guidance for Robotaxi for three consecutive quarters. The question received 741 votes, representing approximately 1.5 million shares of Tesla stock.
Previously, capital markets valued Musk based on his "future"; now, the market is re-pricing his future based on his "speed of execution."
It was against this backdrop that the question of whether Tesla and SpaceX would merge suddenly became one of the most discussed topics on this earnings call.
When asked if the two companies might merge, Musk did not directly deny it. He stated that collaboration between Tesla and SpaceX is increasing, but a merger is not something to be discussed on an earnings call and must go through the proper process. Tesla’s General Counsel subsequently also referred to SpaceX as a key partner of Tesla, noting that multiple mutually beneficial transactions already exist between the two.
The reasons given by supporters of a merger are not hard to understand: Tesla and SpaceX are already collaborating in areas such as batteries, manufacturing technologies, AI infrastructure, and the chip factory Terafab. JPMorgan believes that the operational integration between the two companies is already quite advanced, and sharing engineering talent, AI infrastructure, and Elon Musk himself could create conditions favorable for a future merger. Gwynne Shotwell, President of SpaceX, has also stated that integrating the companies could help simplify the management of Elon Musk’s enterprises.
However, given the real-world context, the two companies are at different stages of their value cycles. SpaceX has a more mature business with concentrated control, while Tesla is a publicly traded company with widely dispersed ownership. If the transaction pricing favors either side, shareholders on the other side may feel they are paying for Musk’s broader strategy.
Whether a merger is actually feasible is another matter—but the key point is that this discussion itself has sent a noteworthy signal: capital markets are beginning to reassess the value of Musk’s other assets and whether they can provide stronger support for Tesla’s future.
Currently, several core businesses that Musk relies on to support Tesla’s future valuation have not delivered at the pace previously expected by the market.
For a company whose market capitalization has long been built on future expectations, it is a natural process for the market to shift its focus to revenue, profits, and cash flow once a business enters the commercialization stage, moving beyond mere technology demonstrations and visions.
The future will eventually come to fruition—that is precisely the purpose of capital markets.
But the capital market also tends to overlook another thing: cashing out is itself the most time-consuming process.
Looking back at Musk's entrepreneurial journey over the past two decades, capital markets have consistently overestimated speed, while Musk has always extended the timeline.
In 2017, Tesla entered the infamous "Production Hell" due to ramping up Model 3 production, leading to sustained pressure on free cash flow. The market worried whether the company would need to raise funds again—or even survive. Musk later recalled that Tesla was only weeks away from bankruptcy.
In the following years, the Berlin Gigafactory and Texas Gigafactory were successively built, keeping Tesla’s capital expenditures high and causing significant fluctuations in free cash flow. It wasn’t until the Model 3 and Model Y achieved scaled production and the energy storage business began to ramp up that the company reentered a phase of stable cash flow.
The same applies to SpaceX.
The first three launches of Falcon 1 all failed; Falcon 9 took years of iterations to establish reliable reusability; Starlink only gradually became one of SpaceX’s most important revenue sources after continuous launches of thousands of satellites and years of capital investment.
For Musk, having negative free cash flow is not the first time this has happened.
Often, negative free cash flow is not the end of the story, but the most expensive phase before realizing the story.
This is also what makes Musk’s business model unique: he doesn’t tell all his stories at once and wait for them to all come to fruition simultaneously; instead, he continuously uses already realized businesses to support future ones that haven’t yet materialized.
The funds from PayPal's sale became the starting point for founding Tesla and SpaceX; the cash flow generated by the Model 3, Model Y, and energy storage business supports ongoing investments in Robotaxi and Optimus; the commercial revenue from Falcon rockets and Starlink further fuels the continued development of Starship.
In other words, what Musk has truly built is not a collection of isolated projects, but a self-sustaining capital model: using already realized businesses to finance尚未兑现的未来.
In response to SpaceX's stock price decline and increased short positions, Musk once again deployed his familiar "anti-short" rebuttal.
On July 18, he stated on X that institutions that have maintained large short positions in SpaceX for a long time have a very low probability of survival.
At the time, SpaceX's stock price had declined significantly from its post-IPO highs, allowing short sellers to realize substantial paper profits. According to Reuters data, as of late July, the paper profits of SpaceX short sellers amounted to approximately $15.5 billion, with about 56% of the free-floating shares on loan.
This has always been Musk’s most typical response: when the market begins to focus on short-term gains, he consistently tries to refocus the discussion on long-term value.
This round of market reassessment of Tesla is not a bad thing.
It means the capital markets are now demanding that Musk prove his next vision can become a commercial reality, just like his previous stories have.
But at the same time, delivering on promises is never something that can be accomplished in a single quarter or through one earnings report.
Capital markets always wish for the future to arrive sooner, but the real future often arrives much slower than anyone imagines.
Twitter: https://twitter.com/BitpushNewsCN
BitPush Telegram community: https://t.me/BitPushCommunity
BitPush TG subscription: https://t.me/bitpush