Good morning, everyone! Today happens to be the deadline for the GENIUS Act’s rulemaking, and as I revisited USD1, I realized that once a stablecoin reaches a scale of billions of dollars, what people ultimately care about comes down to just a few things—who is issuing it, where the reserves are held, and who is accountable if something goes wrong. These factors directly impact whether we can redeem our funds, how secure they are, and whether institutions will use them at scale. With the GENIUS Act reaching this milestone today, those seemingly bureaucratic provisions—1:1 reserves, periodic attestation, management certifications, AML compliance—will all translate into real-world usability: Can you redeem smoothly? Will institutions be willing to mint large volumes? Can platforms accept it as collateral? And if disputes arise, is there a clear party responsible? All of this hinges on how these rules are implemented. Looking back at USD1 from @worldlibertyfi, its current structure remains fairly transparent: It’s still issued by BitGo Trust Company, and World Liberty Trust has submitted an application for a national trust bank charter to the OCC—but it’s still under review. If the charter is ultimately approved, I won’t just be focused on the buzzword “charter利好.” I’ll be examining whether issuance, redemption, reserve management, custody, and settlement can be placed within a clearer regulatory framework. Institutions’ willingness to deploy larger capital often depends on whether this chain of accountability is robust and well-defined. USD1 is no longer confined to wallets and exchanges—it’s now used across multiple chains, in lending protocols, institutional minting, and even trading and pricing scenarios. The broader its usage becomes, the harder it is to sustain trust through branding and campaigns alone. The system must answer: When money flows out, who takes responsibility for bringing it back? Of course, boundaries must be clear: A national trust bank is not a commercial bank, and USD1 won’t automatically become FDIC-insured just because its issuer holds a charter. A charter adds certainty—but liquidity, operational, and compliance risks still exist. So now, when I evaluate stablecoins, I no longer focus solely on APY. Yield can be subsidized; liquidity can be bought—but a clear chain of accountability cannot be patched together with temporary campaigns. When two stablecoins offer similar yields, won’t you prioritize asking: Who is responsible for issuance and redemption—before you consider APY?