A blockchain can successfully upgrade its cryptography and still leave users unable to access their funds. That's one of the more interesting risks I've come across while following @Starknet's quantum security research. Starknet's programmable accounts allow wallets to change how signatures are verified without requiring the entire network to upgrade. This flexibility matters because quantum-resistant security won't arrive through a single update. Different parts of the ecosystem will need to transition over time. But there's a practical problem here. Imagine a wallet replacing its existing signing key with a quantum-resistant alternative. The upgrade transaction succeeds, but the new key was configured incorrectly. Now the account might no longer recognize the owner's signatures. Even fixing the mistake could become difficult if another valid signature is required. So the migration process itself needs protection. Key ownership checks, compatible verification contracts and reliable recovery mechanisms become just as important as introducing stronger signature algorithms. And this is why I find Starknet's approach worth researching beyond its existing STARK technology. The underlying proofs already benefit from hash-based cryptography, but securing accounts, applications and Ethereum-facing dependencies requires additional work. I've become more convinced that quantum readiness needs to be measured by how safely a network can move from its existing security model to a stronger one. An upgrade only improves security if users can still securely control their accounts afterward. That's the part of Starknet's research I'll be paying closer attention to. https://t.co/S1HxYSsSAF