Fingerprinting a capture at the moment of recording with a content hash, coarse location, and timestamp, then later anchoring the Merkle root on Base creates a verifiable chain of custody that is stronger than most crowdsourced data systems currently offer. A buyer can check that a particular video file corresponds to a fingerprint that was included in an attested batch and that the batch was anchored at a specific time. This is useful for compliance, for training data audits, and for reducing the risk that a vendor is simply reselling old or fabricated footage. It does not, however, prove that the scene was fully covered, that lighting was adequate, that the reconstruction accurately reflects geometry, or that no relevant objects were missed. Provenance guarantees integrity of the record, not completeness or quality of the observation. For many enterprise buyers this distinction is acceptable: they would rather have cryptographically attested imperfect data than unaudited perfect-looking data. The next technical step is richer attestations, perhaps device attestation, multi-view consistency scores, or third-party verification of the reconstruction itself, so that the on-chain record can speak to more than just this file existed at this time and place. @vangrid_io has made these fingerprints and attestations publicly inspectable through its explorer.