A wallet can look completely normal and still have been insecure from the moment its recovery phrase was created. The CryptoJS weak RNG vulnerability shows why. In affected CryptoJS versions, CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random() used a custom pseudorandom construction seeded from JavaScript Math.random() rather than a cryptographically secure platform random source. That matters because cryptographic security depends on unpredictability at the source. The Ill Bloom investigation connected this implementation weakness to real wallet-generation code. Under vulnerable generation paths, nominal requests for 128-bit and 256-bit wallet entropy could collapse into effective search spaces of roughly 2^39 and 2^47 possibilities. The resulting recovery phrases could still: • use valid BIP39 words • pass checksum validation • derive standard blockchain accounts • sign valid transactions • appear completely ordinary to the user This is the critical distinction: A valid recovery phrase is not automatically a securely generated recovery phrase. Another important nuance is that finding an affected CryptoJS dependency does not automatically prove a wallet was exploitable. Investigators need to establish whether the vulnerable random function actually generated recovery phrases, keys, tokens, nonces, or other security-sensitive secrets. CryptoJS 4.0.0 replaced the Math.random-based generation path with native cryptographic random methods. But updating a library fixes future generation. It cannot retroactively add entropy to recovery phrases created years earlier. Importing an affected seed into another software wallet or hardware wallet does not repair it either. The same underlying keys remain derivable. The broader security lesson extends beyond CryptoJS. Developers need to audit actual secret-generation data flows, including direct and transitive dependencies, instead of relying only on package names or top-level dependency scans. For browser applications, Web Crypto exposes crypto.getRandomValues() for cryptographically strong randomness. Node.js and mobile environments provide their own secure cryptographic random APIs. Wallet users should focus on software provenance, maintenance history, generation history, trustworthy randomness, and secure backups rather than assuming that any 12-word or 24-word phrase is automatically safe. Read the full TokenToolHub analysis: https://t.co/2AjB3PrKIZ