🚨 98% of people who self-custody Bitcoin are NOT prepared for it. And the remaining 2%? They’ll never be 100% safe either. This week’s attack on Coldcard stole $38 million from those who did “everything right”: bought a wallet from a trusted brand, stored the seed offline, and practiced self-custody. The flaw had existed in Coldcard’s firmware since 2021: seeds generated with insufficient entropy, using device serial numbers and clock data. The hacker calculated private keys and scanned wallets in just 25 minutes. The company? They released a patched firmware and said, “We take full responsibility.” Nice. But the victims? Lost millions. Will they sue a Toronto-based Canadian company? With what money? With what time? The 98% believe buying a hardware wallet equals guaranteed security. They don’t audit code, verify firmware signatures, understand entropy, test seed recovery, or have a backup plan. The remaining 2% use multisig, distributed backups, and annual recovery tests. But even they are vulnerable: what if the multisig has a bug? Self-custody is an ideal. But “not your keys, not your coins” is a dangerous oversimplification. In traditional systems, you have insurance, transaction reversals, and legal accountability. In Bitcoin, if you make a mistake, it’s over. And if Coinkite makes a mistake, it’s over for you too. The truth is, most people should NEVER self-custody. They’ll lose money due to their own error—or someone else’s error, with no one held accountable. There is no perfect security. There is only risk management. If you hold more than 1 BTC, you SHOULD already have multisig, backups in separate locations, and an heir who knows how to access them. Self-custody isn’t for everyone. It’s for those who understand that code has bugs, companies make mistakes, you can make mistakes, mathematics can be broken—and NO ONE will save you. Understand this before buying your first hardware wallet. 💀