The Coldcard drain isn't a Bitcoin failure. The protocol does exactly what it's told. What it exposes is how badly we want a single thing to point at when something breaks. Roughly 594 BTC, about $38M, gone from around 500 single-sig wallets in 25 minutes. Everyone's pointing at one line of firmware: `#ifndef MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG` checks whether the macro exists, not whether it's actually on. The macro is defined as zero, so the device quietly falls back to software "randomness" built from its serial number and a clock register. Seeds that should carry 128 bits of entropy carry about 40. Guessable. Live since March 2021, and by Coinkite's own reckoning it took AI-assisted code review to surface it, with the attackers holding the same tools the defenders had. I'm reading Stuart Glennan's *Causation: The Basics* right now, and it reframes the whole thing. That `#ifndef` isn't "the cause." It's an INUS condition: an Insufficient but Non-redundant part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient bundle. The bug on its own drains nobody. What drains you is the bug plus no passphrase plus single-sig plus an xpub sitting exposed on-chain plus a fallback that fails silently instead of halting plus five years of audits that never look. Every piece is carrying weight. Remove any one and the theft doesn't happen. So the industry patches the RNG, thanks the vendor, and closes the ticket. That's the tunnel vision that leaves a "fixed" system loaded. The real question is never which piece was the cause. It's which of these non-redundant pieces is cheapest to pull. A passphrase costs nothing and it kills the whole bundle. Our entire ethos is verify, don't trust. The one thing this hinges on, whether your seed came from real randomness, is the one thing almost none of us CAN verify. We swore off trust and then trusted the RNG. If you seeded on affected firmware, move your coins. Add the passphrase. NFA