Editor’s Note: From escalating threats to a rapid ceasefire, and then to ongoing clashes after the ceasefire, the situation surrounding Iran may appear to be de-escalating, but it has not ended—it has entered a more complex phase where ceasefire and strategic maneuvering coexist.
This article centers on a key shift—the negotiation structure is being reversed. As the author, Trita Parsi, notes, military actions did not force Iran to concede; instead, they pushed the United States into a negotiation framework based on its “ten-point plan.” Although Washington has not formally accepted all conditions, its practical concessions on the Hormuz issue represent a significant strategic retreat, restoring Tehran’s diplomatic and economic leverage.
As a result, the outcome of the war took an counterintuitive turn: rather than weakening Iran, it somewhat restored its deterrent capability. Meanwhile, U.S. military actions failed to alter the outcome of the博弈 and instead undermined the credibility of its threats, forcing subsequent negotiations to be based on genuine compromises.
But the ceasefire itself is extremely fragile. Local conflicts continue, and Israel’s actions further increase uncertainty, keeping the entire situation on the brink of escalation at all times, with its stability heavily dependent on external factors.
A deeper consequence is that this conflict, originally intended to pressure or even drive regime change, may instead solidify Iran’s internal power structure. The United States has shifted from a dominant position to a negotiating party, while Iran has moved from a pressured party to an active player, propelling the conflict into a longer and more complex phase.
The following is the original text:
At the start of yesterday, Donald Trump made genocidal threats against Iran on social media; just ten hours later, the situation took a dramatic turn—with the announcement of a 14-day ceasefire agreement based on Iran’s terms.
Even by the standards of the extreme volatility typical of Trump's presidency, this reversal is unusually sharp. So, what exactly have both sides agreed upon, and what does it mean?
In a subsequent post, Trump stated that Iran has agreed to keep the Strait of Hormuz open during the two-week ceasefire. He also said that negotiations will take place during this period, based on Iran’s “ten-point plan,” which he called a “viable” framework for talks.
These ten points include:
1. The United States must fundamentally commit to not engaging in aggressive actions against Iran.
2. Continue to recognize Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz.
3. Accept Iran's uranium enrichment for its nuclear program.
4. Lift all primary sanctions against Iran.
5. Eliminate all secondary sanctions against foreign entities conducting business with Iranian institutions.
6. Terminate all United Nations Security Council resolutions targeting Iran.
7. Terminate all International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions related to Iran's nuclear program.
8. Pay compensation to Iran for war losses.
9. U.S. military forces withdraw from the region.
10. Achieve a ceasefire on all fronts, including the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Of course, the United States did not agree to all ten points. But simply using Iran’s proposed framework as the basis for negotiations constitutes a significant diplomatic victory for Tehran. More notably, according to the Associated Press, during the ceasefire, Iran will continue to control the Strait of Hormuz and, alongside Oman, charge vessels transit fees.
In other words, Washington has effectively acknowledged that reopening this vital waterway requires, to some extent, recognizing Iran's de facto control over it.
Its geopolitical implications could be far-reaching. As Mohammad Eslami and Zeynab Malakouti note in Responsible Statecraft, Tehran is likely to seize this opportunity to rebuild economic ties with Asian and European partners—countries that once maintained close trade relations with Iran but were forced to exit its market over the past 15 years due to U.S. sanctions.
Iran’s strategic considerations are not merely driven by solidarity with Palestinians and Lebanese, but also by clear practical motives. Israel’s ongoing military strikes carry the risk of reigniting direct conflict between Israel and Iran—a confrontation that has already erupted twice since October 7. From Tehran’s perspective, achieving long-term de-escalation with Israel requires simultaneously ending Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon. This is not a secondary political demand, but a prerequisite.
The upcoming talks between Washington and Tehran in Islamabad may still end without results. However, the fundamental dynamics of the situation have changed. Trump’s use of military force without achieving its objectives has undermined the credibility of U.S. military deterrence and introduced a new variable into U.S.-Iran diplomacy.
Washington may still bluff and wave its military might, but after a failed war, such threats are no longer credible. The United States is no longer in a position to unilaterally set the terms; any agreement must be built on genuine mutual concessions. This requires real diplomacy—patience, restraint, and tolerance for uncertainty—traits not commonly associated with Donald Trump. Meanwhile, this process may also require the involvement of other major powers, especially China, to help stabilize the situation and reduce the risk of conflict escalating again.
Most importantly, whether this ceasefire holds will largely depend on whether Trump can rein in Israel and prevent it from undermining the diplomatic process. No illusions should be held on this point. Israeli senior officials have already labeled the agreement “the greatest political disaster in the nation’s history,” which alone illustrates how fragile this moment could be at any time.
Even if negotiations ultimately collapse, or Israel resumes strikes against Iran, it does not necessarily mean the United States will re-enter the conflict. There is no compelling reason to believe that a second round of conflict would yield different results or prevent Iran from once again gaining the ability to "hold the global economy hostage." In this sense, Tehran has at least temporarily reestablished a degree of deterrence.
Most importantly, this "chosen war" is not merely a strategic miscalculation—it has not led to regime change, but may instead prolong the life of Iran’s theocratic system, much like Saddam Hussein’s 1980 invasion of Iran helped Ayatollah Khomeini consolidate power domestically.
The extent of this misjudgment may continue to trouble historians for decades to come.