Written by: Yacht
X: @AttackOnTATAYA
From MSTR to STRC+: Where does the Strategy universe end?
The idea that "Strategy is a publicly traded company that bought a lot of Bitcoin" is an understanding from last century.
Of course, Strategy remains the most typical Bitcoin Treasury company in the market. As of June 2026, Strategy holds 843,706 BTC, accounting for approximately 4.02% of Bitcoin’s total supply; at a BTC price of around $63,000, its BTC reserves are valued at approximately $53.243 billion. This holding size is sufficient to make Strategy an undeniable whale in the BTC market, and it explains why every purchase, financing activity, minor BTC sale, or adjustment to preferred dividend payments by Strategy is amplified by the market and triggers significant volatility.
But what makes Strategy truly worth studying is not just how much BTC it bought, but that it placed BTC onto the balance sheets of traditional capital markets, then fragmented this BTC exposure into diverse financial products with varying risk profiles, durations, and return preferences—using complex instruments such as stocks, convertible bonds, perpetual preferred shares, and on-chain protocols. From MSTR to STRC, and now to the on-chain STRC+ ecosystem, Strategy is attempting to upgrade “holding BTC” into “building a credit curve and on-chain yield infrastructure around BTC.”
The problem this article seeks to address is: At the end of the Strategy universe, is it infinite buying of more BTC, or transforming BTC holdings into a credit system accepted by stock markets, fixed-income investors, and DeFi users?
Saylor's Operating Table: How to Transform a Software Company into a Bitcoin Treasury
The story of Michael Saylor, founder and executive chairman of Strategy, is itself a textbook example of reflexivity in capital markets. In Murmurcats’ character profile, he is first and foremost not a crypto OG or exchange founder, but a traditional technology entrepreneur. In 1989, he founded MicroStrategy, whose core business was enterprise data analytics and business intelligence software. During the dot-com bubble, MicroStrategy’s stock price surged, and Saylor’s personal wealth reached its peak; subsequently, the company faced an SEC investigation over financial reporting issues, causing its stock to plummet and Saylor to experience a fall from grace.
This history deeply influenced Saylor and explains why he later came to understand capital markets in an extreme but deliberate way. After 2020, amid global monetary easing and declining purchasing power of fiat currencies, he shifted the company’s cash reserves into BTC and gradually transformed MicroStrategy into a publicly traded company with BTC as its core asset. The company’s name change to Strategy was, in essence, an affirmation of identity: it was no longer an ordinary software company, but a financial engineering firm with BTC at the heart of its balance sheet. A more direct way to put it is: Strategy’s BTC purchases are not simply a matter of “using idle corporate funds to allocate into BTC,” but rather a sophisticated capital design. It raises capital through equity offerings, bonds, convertible debt, and preferred shares, converting the proceeds into BTC; as its BTC holdings grow, the market prices MSTR based on its per-share BTC exposure, Saylor’s narrative power, and its potential for further financing; when the valuation becomes high enough, the company raises more capital and buys more BTC.
This was the original flywheel of the Strategy: BTC price increases drive MSTR stock price higher; higher MSTR stock price enhances the company’s fundraising ability; after raising capital, the company buys more BTC; per-share BTC exposure and market narrative continue to strengthen; the market continues to grant MSTR a premium.
In a bull market, this flywheel is extremely sharp. It transformed a software company that was not inherently glamorous into one of the most active and controversial BTC proxy assets on the U.S. stock market. As a result, MSTR’s trading volume once even surpassed NVIDIA, and the market began to recognize that investors were truly trading not the software business, but the “public company leveraged BTC narrative.” Yet the flywheel’s weakness is embedded within the same structure: as long as it relies on capital market premiums, it is inevitably constrained by shrinking premiums, rising financing costs, and falling BTC prices. Strategy is not an automatically liquidated contract account—it is a publicly traded company with cash obligations, dividend commitments, and constraints imposed by market confidence.
The MSTR flywheel can spin, but it can also get stuck.
Understanding Strategy cannot be separated from mNAV.
mNAV can be roughly understood as the multiple of MSTR’s market value relative to its net BTC asset value. When mNAV exceeds 1—especially significantly above 1—the market is valuing MSTR higher than the net value of its on-book BTC holdings. In this case, issuing common shares to buy more BTC, while diluting equity, may still increase BTC exposure per share if the financing price is high enough, creating a “value-add.” This is the core idea behind premium issuance. Conversely, when mNAV declines or falls below 1, continuing to issue shares at low prices becomes problematic. The dilution from additional shares may offset the benefits of acquiring more BTC; if the company needs to pay preferred dividends, debt interest, or replenish cash reserves while mNAV is already low, selling a small amount of BTC for balance sheet management may be more sensible than issuing common shares at a discount.
Existing research tends to view DATs as characterized by significant return exposure and emotion-driven repricing. For example, Strategy exhibits positive exposure to BTC returns, and BitMine Immersion Technologies exhibits positive exposure to ETH returns, but this exposure does not equate to stable linear leverage. High mNAV may reflect market enthusiasm and financing capacity, or it may indicate valuation congestion and downside risk—this is critical for investors. MSTR is indeed an equity-exposed vehicle for BTC, but it is not an unconditional BTC leveraged ETF. It is influenced by BTC price, equity market risk appetite, financing structure, mNAV status, Saylor narrative strength, and market sentiment. When BTC and U.S. equity risk appetite rise together, MSTR may receive dual support; when BTC rises but U.S. equities weaken, or when BTC falls and the market is unwilling to grant a premium, MSTR’s performance may deviate from the simplistic “BTC substitute” logic.
The general public may be overreacting to Strategy's coin sales, but Strategy selling BTC does not mean Strategy is liquidated. It is more like a signal: when equity financing becomes unprofitable, cash buffers decline, and preferred shares and debt obligations remain, the company begins to balance between the “continue buying crypto” narrative and pragmatic cash management.
This is the first layer of the Strategy universe—MSTR; but MSTR is merely the entry point. What truly transforms Strategy from a BTC treasury company into a BTC credit system is the series of preferred shares and credit instruments it issues afterward.
The financial product chessboard of Strategy
The Strategy product lineup is no longer limited to MSTR—it's larger than you might think.
MSTR, as a common stock, is defined by Strategy as "Amplified Bitcoin," or enhanced BTC exposure. It absorbs the excess volatility and performance剥离 from credit instruments in BTC holdings, aiming to increase Bitcoin Per Share over the long term. In other words, MSTR bears the layer of risk that is most equity-like, most volatile, and most narrative-driven.
On this basis, STRC is a perpetual preferred share of Strategy, positioned as a "Short Duration High Yield Credit." The materials show that STRC currently pays an annualized dividend of 11.50%, distributed monthly in cash; the dividend rate is adjusted monthly with the goal of encouraging STRC to trade around its $100 par value and reduce price volatility. As the market has once again retraced, STRC's price has declined to approximately $94, yielding an effective yield of 12.15%, with a notional size of approximately $10.4895 billion and a 30-day average daily trading volume of about $379 million, and a 30-day historical volatility of 10.2%.
STRD is a long-term high-yield credit instrument with a fixed annual dividend of 10%, paid quarterly, but due to a price discount, its effective yield reached 14.45% in the snapshot. STRK is a structured Bitcoin instrument convertible into MSTR common shares, offering both preferred stock cash flows and participation in common stock upside, with a fixed annual dividend of 8% and an effective yield of 11.74%. STRF is a higher-tier long-term credit instrument with a fixed annual dividend of 10%, along with governance rights and a step-up mechanism for missed dividends, achieving an effective yield of 10.44% in the snapshot.
The significance of this strategy lies in dividing the same BTC balance sheet into different risk tiers: MSTR, the common stock, captures the full upside and downside; STRC offers short duration, high yield, floating dividends, and monthly payouts; STRD, STRK, and STRF correspond to varying durations, conversion rights, seniority levels, and return requirements.
STRC is the most critical layer. It transforms “money seeking fixed income” into capital for Strategy to buy BTC. Traditional fixed-income investors may not want to buy BTC directly or be exposed to the sharp volatility of MSTR common stock, but if there were a tool that pays monthly interest, trades around a $100 par value, and offers a yield significantly higher than traditional short-term bonds, they might be willing to participate. Strategy then uses this capital to further support its BTC balance sheet.
The innovation and controversy of STRC lie in the fact that, while STRC appears to be a high-yield money market product, its risk does not stem from U.S. Treasuries or a diversified credit portfolio, but rather from Strategy’s single-company BTC asset coverage ratio, capital structure, and mNAV status. It does not offer risk-free returns to investors; instead, it provides higher cash dividends at the cost of exposing them to risks including BTC price declines eroding asset buffers, mNAV breakdowns, and dividend mechanism repricing.
In other words, STRC is not a "secure version of BTC," but rather a credit product issued by the BTC treasury company.
Where does the 11.5% STRC yield come from, and who bears the risk?
The most attractive aspect of STRC is its yield, and the most misunderstood aspect is also its yield. If a product in traditional markets appears to be short-duration credit, offers an 11.5% annual dividend, and attempts to trade stably around its $100 par value, investors naturally ask: Where is this money coming from? Who is bearing the tail risk?
STRC may become unpegged under the following circumstances:
Scenario 1: BTC decline breaches the asset buffer. The underlying assets of the Strategy are primarily BTC; when BTC declines rapidly, the company’s asset coverage ratio decreases, causing the leverage ratio to rise mechanically. Although STRC ranks senior to common shares, it is still a preferred share, not a risk-free bond. The deeper the BTC decline, the thinner the safety cushion for STRC’s priority claim on remaining assets, making it more likely for its price to fall below the $100 par value.
Scenario Two: The Dividend Increase Trap. STRC is designed to bring its price back near par through monthly dividend adjustments. If STRC trades between $95 and $99, the dividend rate may increase; if it falls below $95, the pressure to raise the dividend intensifies. In the short term, this can attract income-focused buyers back; in the long term, each increase means higher cash outflows for Strategy. If STRC’s scale continues to grow, the marginal cost of dividend increases will rise steadily.
Scenario three: The flywheel breaks after mNAV falls below 1. The ideal way for the strategy to de-lever is to issue common shares when mNAV is above 1 to buy BTC or improve the capital structure. However, if mNAV remains below 1 for an extended period, issuing common shares would dilute existing shareholders, forcing Saylor to choose among several uncomfortable options: continuing to issue higher-cost preferred shares, unilaterally lowering or pausing the narrative of stable net asset value, or selling BTC to replenish cash.
The discussion around Strategy selling BTC illustrates the real-world manifestation of this risk. Strategy may not sell BTC on a large scale, as BTC is central to its valuation narrative; however, when cash reserves are insufficient, mNAV does not support common equity financing, and preferred dividends and debt interest must still be paid, small-scale BTC sales may become part of balance sheet management. This is not a liquidation event, but rather a sign that the credit structure is entering a zone of stress. We draw a macro analogy between gold and BTC: neither is necessarily a true safe haven during liquidity crises; instead, both may function as “ATMs”—when markets need cash, the most liquid and easiest-to-sell assets are offloaded. The gold market still suffers from partial reserves, opaque custody, and leasing systems; BTC’s advantage lies in its on-chain transparency and verifiability, but under financial market stress, it too may be used to replenish liquidity.
Therefore, STRC cannot be explained solely by “BTC’s long-term upward trend” as a monthly dividend-paying credit product. STRC’s stability depends on three factors holding true simultaneously: sufficient BTC asset buffer, the strategy’s ability to consistently pay dividends, and continued market belief in the MSTR/STRC financing flywheel. If any one of these elements weakens, STRC will be re-priced from a “high-yield stable instrument” to a “credit product with BTC asset-backed risk.”
STRC+, how to bring Strategy credit on-chain
If STRC is the core security of the Strategy credit system, then Saturn and Apyx represent the next step: packaging the cash flows from STRC-like preferred shares into on-chain stablecoin yields.
The Saturn project divides the new financial stack into three layers: the first layer is digital capital, namely BTC; the second layer is digital credit built on top of BTC by institutions such as Strategy; and the third layer is financial applications built upon digital capital and digital credit. Saturn believes it is constructing the third layer—the digital currency layer within a BTC-backed financial system.
Saturn employs a dual-token structure of USDat and sUSDat. USDat is a stablecoin used for liquidity and settlement, with an initial reserve target of 100% allocated to tokenized U.S. Treasury products backed by M0; users can mint and redeem USDat via the Saturn app using USDC. USDat itself does not generate yield directly—it functions more as a settlement and liquidity layer. sUSDat, on the other hand, is the yield layer. Users stake USDat to receive sUSDat, and Saturn uses the associated funds to gain exposure to digital credit instruments. Documentation indicates that during the launch phase, 100% of sUSDat’s digital credit exposure will be allocated to STRC, targeting a yield of 11%+. The yield on sUSDat comes from dividends generated by digital credit instruments such as STRC, reflected through the increasing exchange rate of an ERC-4626 vault, requiring no manual reinvestment by users.
Saturn's risk control focuses on dynamic reserves. It uses the LTV from Strategy's digital credit policy to determine the STRC allocation ratio: when LTV is low, it indicates stronger BTC and equity buffers, allowing for increased STRC exposure to pursue yield; when LTV is high, it shifts toward U.S. Treasuries to enhance stability. As LTV increases, the STRC allocation in sUSDat decreases, and in extreme cases, can drop to 0%. This demonstrates that Saturn is not simply a "full-position STRC yield wrapper," but rather seeks to dynamically switch between STRC yield and U.S. Treasury stability.
However, Saturn’s risks are equally clear. The STRC position is an off-chain digital credit held through a BVI professional fund structure, making the custodian, fund manager, and audit/proof mechanisms elements users must trust or verify. If the Strategy defers STRC dividends under severe market conditions, sUSDat yields will also pause and accrue; since STRC is a cumulative perpetual preferred share, it does not necessarily constitute immediate default, but its price may de-anchor, and users exiting will still face uncertainty in the secondary market and queue processing.
The Apyx project’s structure is more like a “stablecoin/savings protocol for a DAT preferred stock basket.” In Apyx Docs, apxUSD is defined as an overcollateralized, dividend-backed synthetic USD, distinct from traditional fiat-backed stablecoins like USDT or USDC. Its stability is supported by a reserve of crypto-related, dividend-paying real-world assets, and redemptions are settled in USDC rather than directly delivering the underlying preferred shares.
Apyx also employs a dual-token structure. apxUSD is a non-yielding synthetic USD used for collateral, quoting, and liquidity in DeFi and CeFi; apyUSD is a savings-oriented stable asset that generates yield by absorbing dividend payments from DAT Company’s preferred shares. Apyx positions itself as one of the Dividend-Backed Stablecoin protocols, with initial underlying assets including variable-rate perpetual preferred shares such as STRC issued by Strategy. Its four core components are: Users, Offchain Treasury, Onchain Vault, and the equity market. Users obtain apxUSD by depositing USDC; the Offchain Treasury allocates funds into low-volatility, dividend-paying perpetual preferred shares or highly liquid cash equivalents, collects dividends, and converts them into on-chain distributable yields; the Onchain Vault then distributes these yields to holders by increasing the redemption value of apyUSD.
Unlike Saturn, Apyx differs in that it does not merely tokenize STRC as a single asset, but aims to build a basket of DAT preferred shares. The collateral backing apxUSD can be dynamically allocated among preferred shares issued by different DATs and rebalanced according to issuer concentration, liquidity, and coverage requirements. Its long-term goal is to transform the cash flows from preferred shares in public markets into on-chain stablecoin yields.
The risk with Apyx lies in the fact that apxUSD is not strictly 1:1 pegged, apyUSD yields are not guaranteed, and neither is a risk-free asset; users may face DEX liquidity shortages, apyUSD redemption cooling periods, underlying preferred stock price volatility, offchain custody risks, and smart contract risks. In other words, Apyx brings yields on-chain, along with credit risk, liquidity risk, and execution risk.
New trends in DeFi: Can BTC credit become the underlying asset for on-chain yields?
Saturn and Apyx most imaginative aspect is that they provide DeFi with a source of yield different from traditional stablecoin returns.
In the past, common sources of high yields on-chain for stablecoins included funding rates, basis trades, lending spreads, LP subsidies, or protocol token incentives. These yields were often cyclical: during bull markets, funding rates were high, basis opportunities were abundant, and protocols were willing to offer subsidies, making yields appear very attractive; however, once scale increased, trading became crowded, or the market cooled down, yields would decline.
STRC+ presents a different narrative: the returns come from dividend payments on DAT preferred shares in the public market. In this model, BTC enters the balance sheet of a publicly traded company, which issues preferred shares to raise capital; these preferred shares generate cash dividends, which are then purchased or held by an on-chain protocol and converted into on-chain stablecoin yields.
If this logic holds, it has multiple implications. First, it brings TradFi cash flows into DeFi: on-chain users receive cash dividends from preferred shares of publicly traded companies, rather than protocol subsidies or exchange funding rates. Second, it transforms BTC from a “static store of value” into a “collateral base for credit curves.” While BTC itself does not generate cash flow, publicly traded companies holding BTC can issue securities of varying seniority tied to BTC, creating a hierarchy of duration, yield, and risk. STRC is an early product along this credit curve. Third, it introduces a new source of yield for stablecoins. Apyx’s documentation emphasizes that while the stablecoin market is already large, most stablecoins do not automatically pass on reserve yields to holders; Apyx aims to solve the problem of “idle dollars earning no return” using DAT preferred dividends. Saturn separates the liquidity layer of USDat from the yield layer of sUSDat, allowing users to choose between stability and yield.
But the challenges of this path are clear. The underlying assets are off-chain securities, not native on-chain assets. Users must rely on custody, fund structures, audits, NAV oracles, third-party attestations, and redemption processes. Even if the protocol’s transparency is excellent, it cannot achieve fully atomic verification like on-chain spot trading. More importantly, the returns come from STRC or other DAT preferred shares, which ultimately depend on the issuer’s asset coverage and ability to pay. Therefore, DeFi users in STRC+ are not exposed to a single risk, but a set of compounded risks: strategy credit risk, BTC price volatility risk, mNAV contraction risk, secondary market liquidity risk for preferred shares, protocol redemption risk, off-chain custody risk, and smart contract risk. The high yield is not created out of thin air—it is merely split, packaged, transferred, and re-presented through an on-chain interface.
Where is the end of the Strategy universe?
What if we consider more possibilities for the fate of the Strategy universe?
In the best-case scenario, Saylor successfully creates a native BTC credit curve. MSTR continues to act as a high-volatility equity layer absorbing BTC upside and narrative premiums, while senior securities and structured products such as STRC/STRF/STRK/STRD meet the capital demands of diverse yield and risk preferences. Protocols like Saturn and Apyx then move these cash flows on-chain. At that point, Strategy is no longer just a company that buys BTC, but an infrastructure connecting BTC, traditional capital markets, and DeFi yield layers.
During market volatility, STRC becomes a high-risk, high-yield DAT credit product, with the STRC+ ecosystem available but limited in scale. Fixed-income investors are willing to accept some BTC-related credit risk for yields above 10%, and on-chain users are also willing to allocate portions of apyUSD or sUSDat; however, these products always require high transparency, substantial collateral buffers, and sufficient liquidity, preventing unlimited expansion.
The most pessimistic scenario, closely aligned with recent market trends, is: prolonged mNAV stagnation, BTC price decline or sideways movement, rising dividend pressure, ordinary equity financing no longer being viable, and the escalating cost of continuing preferred equity expansion. The flywheel shifts from “financing to buy BTC” to “balance sheet defense.” Under this scenario, Strategy may not face liquidation or大规模 sell BTC, but the market will reprice its credit instruments: STRC will no longer be viewed as a yield product akin to money market funds, but rather as a high-yield preferred stock deeply tied to the credit of BTC treasury companies.
In any case, the endgame of Strategy is unlikely to be “buy BTC infinitely.” Infinite buying is merely a narrative of the first phase. The true endgame is whether the market is willing to long-term accept a new credit system with BTC as the underlying asset, corporate capital structure as the intermediary, preferred stock cash flows as the income source, and DeFi protocols providing on-chain packaging. If the market accepts it, Strategy will evolve from a BTC treasury company into an issuer of BTC credit curves, and STRC+ will become one of the new foundational assets in the on-chain yield market. If the market rejects it, STRC+ will revert to being a high-yield credit product: tradable, allocatable, and income-generating—but priced as a risk asset, not as a myth of stable returns.
This is the true boundary of the Strategy universe: whether BTC can be continuously recognized by capital markets as a collateral base capable of issuing credit, paying dividends, and supporting on-chain financial applications.
(This article discusses changes in market structure and does not constitute any investment advice, platform recommendations, or advice on avoiding regulation. Sections mentioning specific institutions and products are provided solely to illustrate differences in trading models and infrastructure.)