Short answer in advance: In a scenario in which Gaddafi had remained in power after 2011 and Libya had introduced a real gold standard (or a gold-backed dinar currency), the economic and monetary situation by 2026 would be expected to be significantly more stable and significantly better inflationary than in real Libya history and than in most fiat-based countries. The differences would be especially large in terms of purchasing power, currency stability, and cumulative oil revenues—while the system’s ongoing political and structural problems persist simultaneously. 1. Initial situation and scenario assumptions •Real history: Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011. After that, civil wars followed, state collapse (East-West division), massive oil production collapses, high inflation peaks, and a sharp loss of purchasing power. Before 2011, oil production was approximately 1.6–1.7 million barrels per day, GDP per capita was among the highest in Africa, and the HDI was the best on the continent. Inflation was mostly in the low single digits in the late Gaddafi years. • Assumptions of the counterfactual: The uprising is suppressed or a NATO intervention does not occur. Gaddafi remains in power. Libya introduces (as partially planned by him) a gold-backed dinar or strictly ties the currency to gold reserves (approx. 143 tons of gold + silver + oil revenues). Oil is preferred to be sold against gold or gold-backed payment instruments. The central planned economy and the socialist/authoritarian system (Jamahiriya) remain intact. 2. Inflation and currency stability until 2026 Under a gold standard, the money supply is limited in the long run by the gold supply (and the ability to acquire gold). Historically, the classic gold standard regime (circa 1870/1880–1914) led to an average inflation of about 0–0.1% per year – in stark contrast to the fiat systems after 1971 (average 3–5% and more, with strong swings). Expected impacts in Libya: •Very low or near-zero inflation over the entire period 2011–2026. No major pressure phases due to money supply expansion for war financing, subsidies, or deficits. •The dinar could have largely retained or even gained its purchasing power (especially during periods of falling gold prices relative to other goods). •In real terms, there was already 15% inflation in 2011, peaks of 25–28% in 2016/17, followed by lower rates again, but recently (2025/26) renewed periods of pressure due to devaluations and fiscal imbalances. In some reports, inflation rose noticeably again at the beginning of 2026. Comparison with other countries: Most fiat currencies experienced strong inflation spikes in 2021–2023 (energy, supply chains, expansive monetary policy). Countries such as Turkey, Argentina, or several African states had significantly higher cumulative inflation. A gold-backed Libya would have been a clear outlier here with a stable currency – similar to historically Switzerland or Germany during disciplined phases, only with the additional advantage of massive oil revenues. Probability: Very high probability (approx. 80–90%) that cumulative inflation would have been significantly lower than real and than in most comparison countries. Short-term volatility due to gold or oil price fluctuations would be possible, but no sustained devaluation.