Concerning the NFP, let’s look ahead. This NFP cannot be simply interpreted as “strong employment means the economy is fine.” More accurately, this was a NFP characterized by structural strength but weak liquidity. May’s U.S. non-farm payrolls exceeded expectations, but when breaking down the structure, the issues are clear: the majority of new jobs came from leisure and hospitality, education and healthcare, and government sectors—with leisure and hospitality contributing the most, adding approximately 70,000 jobs in a single month, of which 48,000 were in restaurants and bars. This reflects seasonal or structural support driven by peak tourism season, service consumption, and World Cup hype. Meanwhile, finance, information technology, and tech-related industries remained weak; small business hiring plans declined, and tech layoffs continued to rise. In other words, the U.S. labor market is not broadly thriving—it is instead: 1) Supported by services, healthcare, and government hiring; 2) Cooling in tech, finance, and white-collar roles; 3) Facing reluctance from small businesses to expand hiring; 4) Experiencing AI-driven acceleration in replacing certain white-collar and technical positions. Thus, the true signal from this NFP is not “employment is strong,” but rather: aggregate numbers remain robust, but the structure is already deteriorating. This explains why ordinary people feel the job market is worsening, yet the NFP data still beats expectations. The NFP measures net new jobs across the entire economy; as long as restaurants, hotels, healthcare, and government absorb enough workers, they can offset job losses in tech and finance. Looking at additional data afterward, the logic aligns closely with my earlier point about liquidity constraints. The market is concerned about liquidity (and liquidity issues do indeed exist): strong employment → the Fed finds it harder to cut rates, even raising the probability of rate hikes this year → higher interest rates → tighter liquidity → pressure on overvalued assets. If employment were to collapse outright, the Fed would have a clear reason to pivot toward easing, and markets would price in “recession-driven rate cuts.” But the current situation is most awkward: aggregate employment remains solid, inflation risks persist, oil price risks remain, and AI capital expenditures are still at elevated valuations. As a result, markets worry that the Fed has no justification to intervene—and may even become more hawkish again. That said, I do not believe the AI narrative has ended. Real demand still exists in AI Capex, computing power, networking, storage, electricity, and data centers—the industrial trend has not been reversed by a single NFP report. Assets with high valuations, distant profitability, reliance on continuous funding, and purely speculative narratives will experience increased volatility; whereas companies genuinely facing industrial bottlenecks, with visible orders and deliverable earnings, are more likely to emerge stronger after the correction. On China-U.S. relations: Over the past year, the correlation between U.S. and Chinese equity markets—particularly AI-related assets—has strengthened. If the U.S. market shifts from an “AI growth trade” to a “high-rate pressure trade,” China’s market will struggle to remain entirely independent. Especially in A-shares and Hong Kong-listed stocks tied to AI computing power, CPOs, storage, power equipment, robotics, and semiconductors—all will face short-term spillover effects. However, it’s important to distinguish: 1) Short-term: impact from risk appetite shocks; 2) Medium-term: still driven by industrial trends and order execution; 3) Long-term: determined by genuine supply-demand bottlenecks and profit realization. Therefore, the next step is not blind bearishness—but rather reducing reliance on pure sentiment-driven valuation expansion and focusing more on sectors verifiable by earnings reports and order flows. The core takeaway from this NFP is not “employment is strong,” but rather: U.S. aggregate employment retains resilience, yet structural divergence is now evident. Services, healthcare, and government are propping up employment; tech, finance, small businesses, and white-collar roles are under pressure. The market decline is not due to a sudden deterioration in fundamentals—but because the stronger-than-expected NFP crushed expectations for monetary easing, reigniting concerns over liquidity risks. The current macro environment is thus: 1) Employment is not weak enough to prompt Fed intervention; 2) Inflation and oil price risks remain unaddressed; 3) AI valuations are no longer cheap; Liquidity has once again become the central variable suppressing risk assets. The probability of an immediate rate hike in June is low, but the Fed will likely adopt a more cautious and hawkish stance. For markets, what’s most painful isn’t an imminent rate hike—it’s the absence of any rate-cut expectations or liquidity backstop. In one sentence: This NFP reduced the probability of a recession-driven rate-cut trade but increased the probability of a liquidity-tightening trade. The AI narrative may not be over—but volatility will intensify significantly going forward.