good to see tyler finally taking part in this discussion with his account. debating is important, especially around this proposal with so many conflicting interests in play.
that's a lot of words that don't mean much, though
plenty of logical fallacies. i'll try to answer ↓
> "comparing ZCG to mining"
the comparison here is regarding ZCG being an inherent, consensus-based, part of zcash economics and protocols rules (which everyone can verify without trust). it was there when he arrived.
i think it’s fair to argue the ZCG mechanism is imperfect and needs improvement (accountability, incentives, etc.). i wouldn’t hate changes, and i’ve said as much in other threads.
i just think community-driven funding has played an important role in developing and promoting zcash as usable freedom/privacy money rather than purely a revenue stream for highly capitalized mining/trading enterprises.
that said, this is my opinion and happy to agree to disagree.
objectively speaking, ZCG is under the same rules of mining from a protocol perspective. both the mining and ZCG portions are protocol-defined allocations of the block subsidy. they have their own set of rules and allocation is done accordingly.
some data is available on: openzcash(dot)org
framing it as USAID or charity (as i saw some people who work for him doing) is a terrible framing and works as political propaganda, but is far from reality. it only confuses people who are new to zcash. we need clarity instead.
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see what i'm doing?
i'm correctly framing what is my opinion and what is objective fact. where his post breaks down is mixing both -- presenting his opinion as facts. some examples:
> “the purest market-based competition imaginable”
mining is described as “the purest market-based competition imaginable” with perfect risk/reward alignment and no structural issues.
in practice, however, PoW exhibits strong economies of scale (ASIC capital intensity, energy contracts, bulk hardware pricing, pool aggregation). this is not theoretical: recent analysis shows persistent concentration (e.g., Cambridge CCAF’s Oct 2026 report on Bitcoin: top 3 pools ~60.8% of blocks, top 6 ~83% over a recent sample, with effective control higher due to proxy arrangements).
large operators capture more of the reward, reinvest in more specialized hardware, and smaller ones get priced out. this does the opposite of strengthening decentralization. it gradually centralized any network that gets mature enough into a few miners. bitcoin is the empirical evidence.
capital is tied to equipment that can be pointed elsewhere or sold, weakening long-term “skin in the game” relative to the network itself. i’ve written extensively about these dynamics before. pure PoW has repeatedly shown this path.
> “ZCG is a choice / optional / not existential” while mining is not.
this is a logical fallacy. both are consensus rules and choices. the protocol can change either (via ZIPs and upgrades, exactly as it has done multiple times with the dev fund).
mining is a choice of consensus mechanism too. many networks have moved away from pure PoW for the same scalability, energy, and centralization reasons.
calling one “ontological” and the other a “slush fund with zero consequences” is rhetoric, not a technical distinction, which is funny coming from someone starting the post with the silly ad-hominem he launched ("either intellectually dishonest or intellectually illiterate.").
if the dollars from either are “incinerated,” the protocol still produces the next block under the same rules. miners "incinerate" their capital too, to pay for energy, infra, work force, etc. it's a highly capital-intensive activity.
what he says about ZCG on that is also not true.
if capital is "incinerated" (in a pejorative way), there will sure be consequences. everything is well-documented.
i agree it's a different form of accountability, though.
> “no skin in the game / no consequences / coinholders have no say.”
governance and accountability can and should be improved (i’ve agreed with some of the concerns raised during his campaign).
but the money is allocated by protocol to the program, the same way mining rewards are allocated to the miner who finds the block.
dilution is real and has economic effects. it is not the same as shared ownership or “coinholders’ money.” (also claimed by the people campaigning about it in his name).
treating protocol allocations as other people’s money that must be reclaimed is an entitlement framing that have weakened the case as is and worked only to divide the community. which has become mostly noise, imo, when there are so many things we should be worrying about.
for more numbers and context on the mining side (including Cypherpunk’s share and the incentives around redirecting emission), anyone can see my earlier post on that (dropping it in the comments).
happy to discuss concrete mechanism improvements or alternative designs (including hybrids like crosslink). the framing that treats one consensus-enforced allocation as pure and the other as illegitimate charity doesn’t advance that. we can all be better than that.