Many people are asking: What happens to Ethereum protocol revenue? Can it really be that L2s take the sequencing fees while L1 builders extract a large portion as well? A reasonable, proportional fee share would be understandable. Currently, even Ethereum’s Glamsterdam upgrade with ePBS (EIP-7732) does not solve this issue. ePBS merely moves the auction into the protocol, eliminates trust reliance on relays, and enforces payment. It does not burn MEV, nor does it redirect builder surplus to the protocol. One proposal, EIP-8375 (ePBS Mandatory Burn of Execution Rewards), suggests burning a portion of priority fees and external builder bids. This way, more value would indirectly benefit ETH holders through burning. However, this is currently only a draft and has been excluded from the Hegotá (next fork) (rated DFI), on the grounds that reward policy requires broader ecosystem-wide discussion and cannot be decided during the fork scope finalization process. It appears that community mobilization is needed to support EIP-8375, to advance MEV burning— by burning a portion of builder bids or priority fees— thereby indirectly benefiting ETH holders through reduced supply.