how to reduce zkTLS overhead while keeping security practical @primus_labs uses a very deliberate approach instead of forcing malicious security across every subprotocol, the architecture uses OLEe where it matters most > OLEe is applied to: - Diffie-Hellman point conversion - GMAC tag computation > the security tradeoff: - selective failure risk is tightly bounded - leakage is limited to at most one bit of the session secret - the high entropy of the TLS pre-master secret makes recovery computationally infeasible > what this removes: - unnecessary zero-knowledge subproofs during key exchange - excessive authenticated triple storage - the need to load huge garbled circuit states into memory > what users get instead: - progressive streaming of computation - approximately 150 MB of memory for standard 2 KB payloads, reportedly - a more practical execution architecture - lower pressure from network and communication overhead good cryptographic engineering is about making costs controlled, bounded and deployable that's the direction @primus_labs is taking with zkTLS.