From predicting February 25 to anticipating November 4… https://t.co/a0oRpmpHXD From predicting February 25 to anticipating November 4… Is another round approaching? The region is gripped by tension, uncertainty, and chaos: threats are escalating, ships await in maritime corridors, diplomatic messages shuttle between capitals, and military preparations openly hint at the possibility of renewed confrontation. At the heart of this scenario stands an unavoidable question: Will November 4 mark the next U.S. strike against Iran—or the beginning of a new phase of war? Let me be clear: November 4 is an analytical projection, not a confirmed report or an officially declared military deadline. But this date is not arbitrary. U.S. reports and analyses have linked the potential resumption of strikes to the period following the midterm elections on November 3. The U.S. president has reportedly ruled out any attack before the elections, while reports indicate new military options are being prepared. This makes November 4—the first day after voting—the most plausible window for a decision previously delayed by electoral calculations. However, precision demands context: The U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran has already begun—on February 28, 2026. Therefore, discussing November 4 does not imply predicting the start of the first war, but rather the potential resumption or expansion of hostilities after months of intermittent conflict and fragile calm. This is the crucial distinction between interpreting facts and inflating headlines. From February 25 to November 4 In my article on February 25, I predicted war before the strikes commenced on February 28. That was not a claim of foreknowledge, but an analysis of converging indicators: political stalemate, hardened demands, rising threats, and accumulating military preparations. Days later, war erupted—confirming that the region stood on the brink of explosion. Today, I revisit that article not to suggest history is repeating itself verbatim, but to highlight that the warning signs preceding the first round have returned in even more complex forms. In February, attention focused on negotiations, the nuclear program, and military capabilities. Today, the picture has expanded to include open fronts, volatile maritime routes, economic losses, fears for the safety of U.S. forces and missions, and domestic electoral calculations in both the United States and Israel. Therefore, I believe November 4 may serve as a test of the U.S. decision: Will the White House content itself with pressure and threats—or will it choose escalation now that direct electoral constraints have lifted? This possibility is reinforced by reports that U.S. military leadership is finalizing preparations for new combat operations, while the Council on Foreign Relations warned that post-election political constraints may ease—but not resolve the strategic dilemma: How can strikes translate into political outcomes? Why November 4? Because November 3 is a sensitive U.S. election date; an unpopular war could become a direct political burden for the ruling party. Combat and rising energy prices pressure American voters; a large-scale strike before voting could open a political door the administration wishes to avoid. After the elections, however, military decision-making space may widen—whether to launch an attack or to use the threat of one to extract concessions in negotiations. Yet, the end of elections does not make war inevitable. Washington faces three options: resume strikes, continue negotiations under pressure, or maintain the status quo with ongoing sanctions and deterrence. Each carries costs. Strikes may demonstrate resolve but won’t guarantee Iran’s submission; negotiations may offer an exit but require mutual concessions; waiting may temporarily reduce the risk of explosion but leaves the root causes of confrontation intact. This is why the day after voting matters: not because it announces a declared war date, but because decisions may become less tied to ballot-box calculations and more aligned with Washington’s assessment of power dynamics and deterrence. What could ignite the next round? The next confrontation may not begin with a formal declaration titled “War Begins.” A major maritime incident, an attack inflicting U.S. casualties, a strike on a sensitive facility, or the collapse of mediation efforts could be enough. A miscalculation or a response exceeding diplomatic boundaries could trigger a cycle of mutual strikes that neither side can quickly halt.