$951 bought $8.5 million and it wasn't a hack, it was a vote. An attacker spent just 0.5 ETH (~6.87M) + 1.68M USDC. No code exploit. No bug. Just a governance proposal no one bothered to stop. The attack was stunningly simple: · Term Finance vaults required staking vault shares for voting power · Almost nobody had actually staked - turnout was near zero · The attacker bought 0.4852 tmvETH for ~0.5 ETH and instantly controlled the vault · With a supermajority, they voted to redirect all funds to their own address What makes this terrifying: This wasn't a new attack pattern. It's a cheaper version of the BonkDAO exploit from July, where the attacker needed millions to buy enough votes. Here, it cost $951. One DeFi founder's blunt response: "Stop using vaults." The industry is finally admitting that vault models are structurally broken. "Near-zero governance participation, misaligned curator risk incentives, and cheap, non-binding audits leave vault models vulnerable to low-cost takeovers." The warning shot: This isn't a fluke. Automated onchain monitoring could have flagged the anomaly, but until protocols fix inactive governance and poor incentive structures, these cheap governance drains will keep happening. Term Finance permanently closed the vault product and revoked governance permissions. Yearn confirmed standard vaults remain secure - the exploit involved Term's custom governance wrapper. $ETH ethereum:0x0bc529c00c6401aef6d220be8c6ea1667f6ad93e ethereum:0x7fc66500c84a76ad7e9c93437bfc5ac33e2ddae9 ethereum:0x1f9840a85d5af5bf1d1762f925bdaddc4201f984