📚 A Mechanism to Distribute Block Contents and Prevent MEV ✅ Overview This proposal explains how to reduce MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) to nearly zero by structurally analyzing why MEV occurs in Ethereum and by distributing the decision-making process for the "contents" of a block. Rather than focusing on the block structure itself, the proposal emphasizes the selection and ordering of transactions, suggesting the addition of a new consensus layer for this purpose. ✅ The Real Reason MEV Occurs MEV arises because miners or validators can freely choose which transactions to include in a block and can reorder them as they see fit. While Ethereum's block structure is agreed upon in a decentralized manner, the content of the block is decided by a single proposer in a short amount of time. This "state where one person decides the content" is the root cause of MEV, including front-running and sandwich attacks. ✅ Consensus on Structure vs. Consensus on Content Blockchain systems have successfully decentralized the consensus on the structure—i.e., who validates which block. However, the decision of which transactions to include and in what order is not decentralized. This proposal explains that this is structurally similar to the double-spending problem of the past. Just as consensus was used to solve the problem of centralized control over a single computer, the same approach should be applied to the content of blocks. ✅ The Idea of a Content Layer The proposed solution is to add a "content layer" (a consensus layer for determining transaction content) on top of the block structure. In this layer, multiple nodes share roles in jointly deciding which transactions to include and in what order. The goal is to eliminate the possibility for any specific validator or sequencer to reorder transactions for their own benefit. ✅ The Basic Mechanism of the Alex Protocol In the example of the Alex protocol, roles are divided: one node collects transactions, another randomizes their order, and a third oversees the entire process and incorporates the results into a block. Each role operates independently, and any attempt by a single participant to act dishonestly is checked and corrected by other participants. As a result, transaction censorship and arbitrary reordering become extremely difficult. ✅ Relationship with Existing Ethereum This mechanism does not disrupt Ethereum's existing consensus. It preserves the current block structure and simply adds a new method for determining content on top of it. The same concept can be applied to Ethereum 2.0 validators, rollup sequencers, and future decentralized sequencers. Therefore, once the mechanism is in place, it can be widely applied, which is a key strength of the proposal. ✅ Impact on Fairness and Price Discovery This design does not exclude necessary market behaviors such as simple arbitrage. On the other hand, it specifically targets MEV that exploits users in an unavoidable way. As a result, the proposal aims to create a network that inherently provides fairness, reducing the need for complex countermeasures on the application side.